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 The National Research Council’s Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 
(2001) reports: “Since World War II, U.S. naval forces have suffered significantly more 
physical damage and operational interference from sea mines than from air, missile, and 
submarine attacks” (2). This threat continues today, and effective methods for fulfilling 
the search, identification, classification, and neutralization functions are needed.  
The United States (U.S.) Navy currently employs specially designed ships to 
satisfy the search through neutralization aspects of the mission (PEO LMW 2009), but 
the Avenger class of mine countermeasure (MCM) ships is aging and reaching end of 
life. The current tactics also place the sailors manning these ships in danger, as the 
MCMs traverse the minefield during their operations (PEO LMW 2009). As a 
replacement solution the littoral combat ship (LCS) has a specifically designed MCM 
mission package (MP) which allows operators the ability to employ a remote mine 
hunting system (RMS) to search, identify and classify mines in a safer manner through 
the removal of the warfighter from the minefield (PEO LMW 2009). The RMS is an 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) that performs sensing operations to find mines. 
Neutralization is carried out by the SH-60S. This report examines the potential use of the 
autonomously operated Mark 18 Modification 2 (MK18 Mod 2) as an alternative or 
supplemental search asset to the proposed LCS MCM MP RMS. 
The RMS is a large UUV launched from the mission bay of the LCS. According 
to Avenger class platform MCM Embark Officer Mark Sergi, it has been under 
development for many years as part of the LCS MCM MP Program of Record (POR), but 
has reportedly suffered reliability and detection problems (Mark Sergi, personal comm.). 
According to MK18 Mod 2 project team member Michael Stuckenschnieder, the MK18 
Mod 2 is a small UUV currently operated by EOD units in the 5th Fleet Area of Regard 
(AOR). It is smaller, slower, and cheaper than the LCS MCM MP RMS, but it is 
currently operational with planned incremental improvements already programmed 
(Mark Sergi, personal comm., Michael Stuckenschnieder, personal comm.). The MK18 
 xx 
Mod 2 is battery powered and the LCS MCM MP RMS is powered by a diesel engine 
(Mark Sergi, personal comm., Michael Stuckenschnieder, personal comm.). 
In conducting this research, the team first embarked upon a literature review to 
develop an understanding of legacy and current MIW systems, operations, and the MK18 
Mod 2. This review was supplemented with information from stakeholders and subject 
matter experts (SME) during an analysis of their needs in development of a problem 
statement, project scope and requirements of the mission thread which could be satisfied 
within the constraints of the capstone project. As this study is a follow on effort to the 
2014 MIW capstone project, the recommendations provided by that study identified some 
gaps in capabilities, systems, and functions, and this team extended the research focus 
with the inclusion of the MK18 Mod 2 into the LCS MCM MP. The primary research 
questions were developed using the established metrics that the U.S. Navy uses to 
measure the effectiveness of an MCM capability (source: 2014 MIW capstone) and 
applied to the MK18 Mod 2 in a comparative analysis. 
The goal of the 2015 MIW capstone team was to provide meaningful data to 
decision makers regarding the possible employment of the MK18 Mod 2 in place of the 
LCS MCM MP RMS. While the decision to model the MK18 Mod 2 in lieu of the LCS 
MCM MP RMS had already been made, this substitution was later suggested as a 
possible alternative by both the Senate Armed Services Committee’s (SASC’s) ranking 
member and chairman in a letter to the Department of Defense (DOD) (Rear Admiral 
Rick Williams, USN (Ret), personal comm.). This study was restricted by its need to 
remain unclassified; therefore, SMEs provided representative ranges of data for the 
various systems.  
Using a tailored systems engineering process, the team first performed an analysis 
of stakeholder needs to determine the requirements for our study and these were scoped 
using the project constraints as detailed above. Systems analysis involved gaining 
understanding of the MCM missions, operational characteristics of the MK18 Mod 2, and 
also the decomposition and operation of the model provided to the 2015 MIW team for 
use as the follow on study to the 2014 MIW team’s efforts. Building upon and extending 
the 2014 MIW capstone team’s work, the 2015 MIW study added the possible mission 
 xxi 
configurations utilizing the MK18 Mod 2 into the operational scenario configurations 
modeled. The 2015 MIW team implemented a modeling approach which allowed for the 
simulation of varying quantities of MK18 Mod 2s and associated support activities to 
leverage the existing model for consistency of data. The resultant data produced by the 
multiple model variants was then statistically analyzed for use in the comparative 
analyses with the other MCM mission options previously modeled. 
A primary research question examined in this study was to determine if the MK18 
Mod 2, when used as the search asset, could equal or surpass the overall mission 
effectiveness when compared with the legacy MCM methods or current LCS MCM MP. 
To realize this goal, 11 operational scenarios (which involved varying the quantities of 
the MK18 Mod 2 from one to 10, and 12) were modeled in the same manner as the 2014 
MIW capstone project to provide a valid comparison using unclassified data.  
These 11 variations of the LCS using the MK18 Mod 2 leveraged the base 
ExtendSim model of the LCS version 3 of the 2014 MIW capstone, and extended it to 
support the simulation of the MK18 Mod 2 performance and mission support 
characteristics. A mine clearance design reference mission area of 10 nautical miles 
(NM) by 10 NM containing bottom mines in deep water (depth of greater than 200 feet) 
was used for data consistency between the efforts. The MK18 Mod 2 scenarios modeled 
produced data for the calculation of SME and stakeholder interest of the measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) for comparison with the prior study of area coverage rate sustained 
(ACRS) and percentage of mines cleared (% clearance) (source: 2014 MIW capstone). 
An excursion to investistigate the 2015 MIW team’s hypotheses surrounding the MK18 
Mod 2’s effectiveness in the isolation of the search portion of the mission was also 
performed.  
Using a design of experiments (DOE) approach, each MK18 Mod 2 model variant 
was run using broad ranges of 20 input parameters (which includes operational factors 
such as surface search speed, turn time at end of track, and time to recover equipment by 
the LCS) instituted by the 2014 MIW team as provided by the MK18 Mod 2 SMEs and 
stakeholders to maintain the unclassified nature of the study. These parameters allowed 
for the characterization of the functions and activities applicable to the MCM mission 
 xxii 
(source: 2014 MIW capstone) and determination of the significant variables affecting the 
response MOE of interest, ACRS and percent clearance, to focus our research. A table 
with all factors, including their value ranges, is presented in the body of this report. 
From the ACRS plot in Figure 1, it can be seen that an LCS configuration 4M 
using 4 MK18s exceeds the ACRS performance of both the legacy 2a and LCS 
configuration 3 by 0.70 and 1.25 respectively. Percent clearance was seen to drop below 
that of legacy configuration 2a and LCS configuration 3 values by approximately 6.5%. 
This can be attributed to the difference in ranges used for surface probability of detection 
for the previous project (0.70 to 0.90) and those used for this project and the MK18 (0.60 
to 0.85). With a lower range it was expected and verified by simulation results that a 
lower percent clearance would be seen. When surface probability of detection increases, 
more mines are detected, resulting in a slight reduction in ACRS. Configurations of 1 
through 10 MK18s is the primary focus of this study, but after plotting the results in the 
initial plots of Figure 1 for up to 10 MK18s, it was noted that as additional MK18s were 
added to the simulation, the ACRS increases began to diminish. A run simulating 12 
MK18s was then conducted in order determine if there was a convergence. This single 
excursion did not provide enough clarity to determine at what point increases in numbers 
of MK18s results in no significant ACRS increase. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean of ACRS vs. Configuration 
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During this DOE, the focus was to determine which factors had the greatest 
impact on the response variables of ACRS and percent clearance. As shown in Table 1, 
the top three significant factors affecting each configuration for ACRS are shown, and 
these factors change as the number of MK18s increase. As these numbers go up, time to 
replenish and actual search speed become less important and the ability of the MK18 to 
correctly classify non-mine targets becomes the most significant, followed by the overall 
probability of detection. 
 
Table 1. ACRS Top Three Significant Factors 
 













5M S_Pcnn S_Replenish_hr S_SearchSpeed_kt 
6M S_Pcnn S_Pd S_Replenish_hr 
7M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 
8M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 
9M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 
10M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 
 
The top three significant factors for percent clearance are presented in Table 2. 
Surface probability of classifying a MILEC as a MILCO (S_Pcmm) dominates the top 
position with airborne probability of identifying a MILCO as a mine (A_Pimm) and 
Surface Probability of detecting a MILEC (S_Pd). Again, since the air asset was not the 
primary focus of this project S_Pd was chosen as a factor of interest over A_Pimm 
although both factors had t ratios that were very close together. After close analysis of 
significant factors for both ACRS and % clearance, it can be seen that effective numbers 
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of MK18s (four or greater) are most significantly impacted by the ability of the sensor 
and operators to detect and classify targets. 
 
Table 2. Percent Clearance Top Three Significant Factors 
 
Configuration 
(# MK18) 1 2 3 
1M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
2M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
3M  S_Pcmm S_Pd A_Pimm 
4M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
5M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
6M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
7M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
8M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
9M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
10M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
12M  S_Pcmm A_Pimm S_Pd 
 
Mission costs were also compared for each MK18 Mod 2 configuration evaluated 
using point estimates derived from operation and sustainment (O&S) data provided by 
stakeholders and SME. The MK18 Mod 2 configurations were assumed to consist of a 
single rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) for every two MK18 Mod 2 in transit. Total 
mission costs of the legacy and current LCS variants used the same point estimates as the 
2014 MIW team for consistency of data. Of note in the resulting cost analysis was that 
the O&S costs for the currently planned LCS MCM MP resulted in a lower total per-
mission cost than the other tested MCM variants. Key to this finding is the broader range 
of probability of detection (Pd) provided to the team for the MK18 Mod 2 which 
produced a larger target list and the resulting expenditure of neutralizers on non-mines. 
However, overall MK18 value was shown to be greater than legacy or LCS MCM MP 
configurations for MK18 numbers of four or more as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 also 
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shows that six MK18s had the highest value, but all MK18 configurations over four 
provided more mission value than either the legacy or the LCS MCM MP. 
Figure 2. Configuration vs. Normalized ACRS Performance/Cost 
This study has concluded that, in the specific scenario modeled with the 
unclassified data ranges utilized, the MK18 Mod 2 is an effective alternative search asset 
to the LCS MCM mission package and legacy MCM methods when implemented with 
four or more devices performing the search function in terms of ACRS performance. 
When effective numbers of MK18s are utilized, the ability of the MK18 to detect and 
classify the target has the biggest impact on both ACRS and percent clearance, meaning 
that if large numbers of MK18s are used, this is likely the area to concentrate on for 
improvements. Using the cost estimates for the analysis, based upon the data provided, 
variant 2 of the LCS with the MK18 Mod 2 performing the search function has been 
shown to have the highest ACRS performance/cost when four or more MK18s are 
utilized. Recommendations to improve the probability of detection and classification of 
the MK18 to equal or exceed those of the LCS MCM MP RMS will allow the MK18 













































































Normalized ACRS Performance/Cost 
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In order to fully capitalize on the effort put into this project, the model as 
developed this far needs to be replicated in a secure enclave and populated with classified 
data. This will allow for a realistic comparison between various solutions and should also 
consist of more detailed cost data than this project team had available. Future work is also 
recommended in expanding the operational scenario depicted in the current MCM model 
utilized by this capstone group, such as study of lane clearance missions, simulations of 
differing mine types, as well as changing the bottom depth. Other areas of consideration 
are further study into the existing scenario, such as investigations into the diminishing 
returns of added MK18s, or including in the simulation the ability to “share” RHIBs 
among the MK18s rather than require a separate RHIB for every pair of MK18s. Other 
autonomous vehicles exist that might also provide capability over the LCS RMS, and 
these should be investigated as well. Another approach could be to fully revisit the 
underlying assumptions of the existing model based on stakeholder feedback, for 
example, to conduct all search prior to beginning neutralization, and then selecting the 
lowest density corridor for clearance to minimize time required to conduct neutralization.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This report provides the results of the evaluation of alternative defensive mine 
countermeasures (MCM) of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fitted with the Mark (MK)18 
modification (Mod) 2 Mission Package (MP) in comparison to the legacy Avenger class 
MCM ship (MCM 1), and the currently deployed LCS and associated remote mine 
hunting system (RMS). This study, conducted in part to satisfy the requirements of the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Master of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) 
and Master of Science in Engineering Systems (MSES) programs, followed a tailored 
systems engineering process described within the body of this report. The study has 
focused on furthering the understanding of legacy and future mine warfare (MIW), MCM 
capabilities and alternative solutions through extensive literature reviews, stakeholder and 
subject matter expert (SME) feedback incorporated into a model constructed following a 
structured systems engineering process to provide a method for comparative analysis. A 
preliminary stakeholder analysis framed the project objectives and was refined to form 
the project’s scope and problem statement. 
This introductory chapter provides background information on naval mine 
warfare in historical context, the progression of available technologies and practices 
evolving into the present day threat and potential counter-measures. To further the team’s 
understanding of MIW and MCM missions, an extensive literature review of topics 
within the research problem space was performed allowing for refinement of the specific 
MIW/MCM problem area leading to the focused problem statement. The chapter 
concludes with the systems engineering approach implemented within the research study. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Sea mines have been an integral component of naval warfare and have been used 
tactically since the colonies fought the British Fleet continuing through the present. 
Although relatively inexpensive to manufacture and employ in battle, they continue to 
show effectiveness in both offensive MIW and defensive and MCM applications 
countering the dominance of a superior navy. While particularly useful as an asymmetric 
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weapon, they are effective against any navy regardless of the relative strengths.  “Since 
World War II, U.S. naval forces have suffered significantly more physical damage and 
operational interference from sea mines than from air, missile, and submarine attacks” 
(National Research Council, Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 2001, 2), depicted 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Navy Mine Casualties 1950–1991 (source: PEO LMW 2009) 
Rather than directly engaging the United States (U.S.) Navy, mines have proven 
to be an effective strike capability for hostile forces employing asymmetric tactics, as 
demonstrated in the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf wars. When used tactically, sea mines can 
provide a delay of attack or impede the availability and movement of supplies, forcing 
recalculation of strategic and tactical plans. A general consensus shared among the 
available research literature is that although MIW and MCM tactics have remained 
relatively static for the duration of their employment to present, technology advances will 
transform the capabilities and act as multipliers in the potential effectiveness of future 
mine warfare (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 1991; Commander Joint Chiefs 
of Staff 2011; Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 2001). 
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Through the literature reviews, the team has concluded that as with offensive 
MIW tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), defensive MCM methods remain 
relatively static in application as well as relying primarily on intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) for mitigation of the mine threat. With the proliferation of 
adversaries capable of implementing sophisticated and hard-to-find naval mines, the need 
for ISR will remain critical for the U.S Navy to remain the dominant sea power 
(Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Septemeber 2010). In 
conjunction, the methods and technologies employed for MCM will have to match or 
exceed those capabilities that exist on the offensive MIW. As stated in the U.S. Navy 
Mine Countermeasures Familiarizer report, historically mines have not been perceived as 
the target but rather as an obstacle. As a result, attention and funding during non-
combatant times for offensive MIW and defensive MCM tactics remain relatively 
unchanged from the earliest implementations (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 
1991). Naval mines though have become increasingly sophisticated and consist of 
differing deployment and actuation methods, each requiring a unique approach for 
identification, classification and ultimately neutralization complicating the present and 
emerging MCM mission thread (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 1991).  
From the end of the Vietnam War through the 1990s, little attention was paid to 
the modernization of the mine warfare assets, and fleet resources remained static (Melia 
1991). Additionally, the U.S. effectively facilitated the ability of our adversaries to 
implement effective mine warfare tactics against our strengths by allowing the programs 
to wane in non-conflict periods by not recognizing the need for continued diligence in 
MIW and MCM efforts. As the new 21st century naval warfighting concepts of Forward 
… from the Sea (Department of the Navy 1994) were being developed in the mid-1990s, 
the need for enhanced littoral capabilities was one item identified, providing the 
opportunity to shape the framework of future MIW and MCM capabilities.  
To address these issues the U.S. Navy planned to address the MIW/MCM mission 
in a holistic manner, placing new emphasis on the entirety of the mission doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) through 
the establishment of MIW as a major naval warfare area (National Research Council, 
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Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 2001) with upgraded certification, training, 
education and officer career planning. Materiel improvements are being implemented 
through the replacement of the ageing Avenger class ships and airborne assets currently 
providing MIW/MCM capabilities with specific MP configurations of the LCS and 
associated remotely controlled airborne and seabound assets. As noted in the National 
Research Council (NRC) Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Mine Warfare 
Operation and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces, the LCS MIW/MCM MP 
currently in service do not execute the mission in similar fashion to the Avenger class 
ships, and current capabilities have yet to be proven as effective as the legacy 
configurations (National Research Council, Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 
2001). In the current budgetary constrained environment, decisions on how to allocate 
funding between sustainment of legacy assets and development and deployment options 
of LCS MP capabilities must be made by leadership to provide adequate MIW/MCM 
capabilities to the fleet while remaining fiscally responsible. Our study contributes to that 
effort through the modeling of critical measures of effectiveness (MOE) of stakeholder 
systems of interest (Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare 2009).  
This project is primarily concerned with investigating area coverage rate sustained 
(ACRS) and percent clearance. ACRS is defined as the area covered divided by the total 
time to clear that area over a 24-hour period. Percent clearance is defined as the number 
of mines neutralized divided by the number of mines existing in the minefield. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW/RESEARCH 
Current MCM capability consists of the MCM 1 Avenger class vessels. These 
vessels are planned to be completely retired by 2024 (Program Executive Office Littoral 
and Mine Warfare 2009). The LCS MCM mission package is the planned successor. It is 
unknown how the LCS mission package will perform regarding both the total capability 
of the mission package and how it will compare with existing MCM Avenger class 
capability. According to the MIW community, the need to compare the developmental 
Mark 18 Mod 2 and other autonomous mine detection systems to RMS used in the LCS 
MCM mission package is required. 
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The research methodology included a literature review which provided 
background on mine warfare basics, mine countermeasure activities, and the history of 
MIW to better understand the need for MCM improvements. The purpose of the literature 
review was to gain a comprehensive overview and understanding of the history and back 
ground of MCM. This was necessary to understand the problem and ask the necessary 
questions to make the correct assumptions for successful model modification. The project 
team was not familiar with any aspect of MIW before starting this project. Without this 
understanding the team would have been unable to successfully comprehend the problem 
and craft a solution to satisfy stakeholder’s needs and project objectives. This research 
allowed for critical capability identification, identification of a realistic mine clearance 
area, and identification of the capabilities, as well as the limitations, of the MK18 Mod 2 
and the LCS MCM mission package. Prior to conducting any modification to the existing 
model simulation, technical information and details were required to support initial 
project research.  
Mines have been employed on a small scale since the time of the Revolutionary 
War and used on a larger scale since the Civil War. Due to their relatively low cost, ease 
of employment, and battlefield effectiveness mines remain “easy to lay and difficult to 
sweep; their concealment potential is strong; their destructive power is high; and the 
threat value is long-lasting” (Erickson, Goldstein and Murray 2009, 1). Typical mine 
construction is “composed of different combinations of explosive charges, firing 
mechanisms, sensors, and housings.” “They can be described by their position when 
planted as bottom, moored, previously moored floating, or as drifting mines” (Melia 
1991, 5). The most commonly used mines historically are contact mines that are typically 
moored. These moored mines can be countered by severing the tether and allowing them 
to rise to the surface for destruction. Bottom mines that consist of influence mines are 
target and water depth dependent. Modern mines often contain sophisticated control 
systems that contain ship counters, delay instruments, and self-destruct capabilities. The 
advent of microcomputers has seen the rise of “smart” mines that are capable of targeting 
specific types of ships and can turn themselves on and off to avoid detection. (Melia 
1991). 
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Mine Countermeasure activities are classified in one of two categories; passive 
and active. Passive MCM activities consist of efforts to avoid mines and detonations 
while active efforts consist of offensive activities with the goal of mine detection, 
neutralization, and collateral damage reduction.   
A review of legacy mine warfare capability was initially performed through the 
review of documents referenced and used by the previous MIW Capstone team. “The 
Avenger class ships perform legacy mine sweeping and hunter-killer capabilities to find, 
classify, and destroy moored and bottom mines with sonar and video systems, cable 
cutting devices, and mine detonating devices that are capable of being released and 
detonated by remote control” (Office of Corporate Communication (SEA 00D) 2014, 1). 
These ships are fiberglass sheathed, constructed with a wooden hull and are capable of 
conventional mine sweeping methods. (Office of Corporate Communication (SEA 00D) 
2014) 
Based on the initial problem scope, the MK18 Mod 1 Swordfish and primarily the 
MK18 Mod 2 Kingfish autonomous unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) capabilities were 
researched. Both designs followed from the Remote Environmental Monitoring Unit 
System (REMUS) Autonomous Hunting Vehicle (AUV) developed in the 1990s.  “The 
REMUS 100 was used by the U.S. Navy for shallow water mine detection” (Remote 
Environmental Monitoring Unit System (REMUS) n.d., 1). The MK18 Mod 1 Swordfish 
UUV, which was based on the REMUS 100, is “designed to Search, Classify, and Map 
(SCM) the very shallow water (VSW) region (10-40 ft.)” (Remote Environmental 
Monitoring Unit System (REMUS) n.d., 1). It is capable of conducting low-visible 
search, classification, and mapping operations in support of MCM activities. The MK18 
Mod 2 Kingfish UUV, which was based on the REMUS 600, reached full operational 
capabilities in 2008 (Naval Expeditionary Warfar 2010). It possesses an “increased area 
coverage rate (ACR), increased endurance, and will serve as a platform for advanced 
sensors” (Remote Environmental Monitoring Unit System (REMUS) n.d., 1). The MK18 
Mod 2 Kingfish provides a wider search path, the detection of buried targets, and higher 
resolution imagery. The first MK18 Mod 2 Kingfish were deployed by the U.S. Navy to 
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the Middle East in July of 2012. They were tasked with search, classification, and 
mapping missions.  Figure 2 details the components of the MK18 Mod 2 UUV.  
 
Figure 2.  MK18 Mod 2 Components (source: AUVAC 2015)  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to fulfill the stakeholder’s needs, research questions were identified to 
formulate the MIW problem and develop the topic. These questions provided a guideline 
for scoping and defining the problem.   
How adequately does the current MCM force address the critical operational 
capabilities needed now? 
The Avenger class MCM 1 is the current force used in MIW/MCM missions. 
Obtaining the metrics for the MCM 1 will provide the potential gaps by understanding 
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the concept of operations (CONOPS), capabilities, and the desired capabilities for 
successful MIW/MCM missions. 
What capabilities and limitations does the projected future force have regarding 
its ability to address critical operational capabilities, as well as cost? 
The LCS is the future force that will be used in MCM missions. Obtaining the 
preliminary metrics will provide the potential gaps by understanding the CONOPS, 
capabilities, and the desired capabilities for successful MIW/MCM missions. 
What is the appropriate number of MK18 Mod 2 platforms to search for mines 
within a 10x10 grid (100 NM2) scenario compared to the LCS MIW package? 
When releasing one or many MK18 Mod 2 UUVs into the given scenario, it is 
important to determine which combination has the highest ACRS and percent clearance 
values for the overall mission with respects to searching.   
What are the metrics used to determine the success of MCM? 
Obtaining and narrowing down from the 38 factors that the 2014 MIW team 
utilized, these metrics will help to understand the CONOPS, capabilities, and the desired 
capabilities for successful MIW/MCM missions with respects to ACRS and percent 
clearance. 
What is the effectiveness and cost of the MK18 Mod 2 at which it could match or 
exceed the LCS MP1 and legacy Avenger class MCM mission packages overall? 
Obtaining the effectiveness and cost of the MK18 Mod 2 will help to determine 
how many UUVs would need to be implemented during a search function when 
compared to the LCS MP1 and legacy Avenger class MCM mission packages. ACRS and 
percent clearance values would be used to determine the best solution. 
D. PROBLEM 
Mine warfare has been a factor in naval conflicts since the Revolutionary War, 
and since World War II has resulted in greater U.S. ship losses than any other weapon 
type (National Research Council, Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 2001). After 
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every major conflict, U.S. forces have neglected the development of mine warfare and its 
TTPs until the next incidence of mine usage (Melia 1991). Effective MIW capabilities are 
necessary to ensure U.S. and coalition forces access to contested waters in order to 
maintain sea lines of communication (SLOC). Current budgetary pressures require naval 
forces to be judicious with their funding in order to assure effective MIW capabilities 
against emerging and evolving threats. Asymmetric threats from state and non-state 
actors exist; the naval mine continues to be an effective asymmetric threat (National 
Research Council, Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 2001). 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Sea mines have been used throughout history both defensively and offensively as 
a deterrent against opposing naval forces. Mines can be used to delay attack and impede 
resupply. Although tactics have remained fairly static over the years, many advancements 
in technology have the ability to transform these capabilities to act as force multipliers. 
By allowing the modernization of mine warfare assets to become static in periods of non-
conflict the U.S allowed adversaries to gain an advantage. The U.S. Navy addressed these 
issues holistically through non-materiel means, such as establishing upgraded 
certification, training, education, and officer career planning. Materiel improvements 
were made by the planned replacement of aging Avenger class ships and airborne assets 
that are in current use providing MIW/MCM capabilities. LCS MIW/MCM mission 
packages currently in service do not perform missions in a similar manner as the Avenger 
class of ships. Additionally, there are concerns that these configurations may not be as 
effective as legacy configurations. Literature review revealed the planned retirement of 
existing legacy MCM 1 Avenger class vessels and the plan for the LCS with the MCM 
mission package to be the replacement. This team, having no prior experience with mine 
warfare, learned much from the literature review and the background of MIW and MCM.  
Questions raised during the literature review range from how adequately the 
current MCM force addresses critical operational capabilities needed now to what 
capabilities and limitations exist with the future force regarding the ability to address 
critical operational capabilities and cost. Mine warfare has been employed in conflicts 
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since the Revolutionary War and since World War II has resulted in more U.S. ship 
losses than any other weapon type (National Research Council, Committee for Mine 
Warfare Assessment 2001). U.S. coalition forces require effective MIW capabilities to 
ensure access to congested waters and to maintain seal lines of communication. Effective 
means for achieving these goals are necessary within the confines of current budgetary 
pressures that require judicious funding considerations for emerging and evolving threats.     
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II. SE PROCESS AND MODELING METHODOLOGY 
Systems engineering is a high level view of the solution space that covers the 
problem definition, analysis, design, construction, testing, production, operations, 
support, and removal from service. This is also known as “cradle to grave.”  Systems 
engineering as a specific discipline in the modern age has been in existence since at least 
the 1940s and is still evolving today. This chapter explains several SE models that were 
considered, the tailored SE process, and the modeling methodology used to solve the 
problem. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Systems Engineering Models 
Systems engineering relies on models to describe the overall process. One of the 
early models used in describing the processes necessary for software engineering was the 
waterfall model. It is characterized by defined activities conducted sequentially, as shown 
in Figure 3.  Each activity is completed prior to advancing to the next activity, and 
iteration only occurs between adjacent activities (Buede 2011). This model was first 
described for software engineering by Royce in 1970 in order to document how software 
engineering was being conducted. Royce then described how this model could be 
improved to address common issues, such as the need to return to non-adjacent steps 
when mistakes are found (Royce 1970). The waterfall model works best when the system 
requirements are fully known and understood upfront with no change over the system life 
cycle. Since the waterfall model is somewhat restrictive and inflexible, this was not 
chosen as the basis for the systems engineering process used for this project. 
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Figure 3.  Waterfall Model (source: Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011) 
Another model used in software engineering is the spiral process model as 
illustrated in Figure 4.  This model attempts to correct for the rigidity of the waterfall 
model by repeatedly passing through iteration phases. The end of each phase results in 
the production of a prototype. Development in each cycle feeds the requirements of the 
next as lessons are learned. Ultimately, this results in an operational prototype leading to 
production. This model type was not chosen for this project as the restrictions of the 
course length do not allow for the creation of multiple prototypes. 
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Figure 4.  Spiral Development Model  (source: Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011) 
The systems engineering “Vee” seen in Figure 5 shows the activities that 
engineers perform and is a roadmap for the systems engineering process to ensure that the 
final product is consistent with original stakeholder needs and system requirements. The 
left side of the “Vee,” also known as the decomposition side, begins with defining the 
operational need and applicable stakeholders. The decomposition and definition process, 
seen as an arrow proceeding down the left side of the “Vee,” is the progression from the 
“operational need to the system-level requirements” and the “specifications” for each 
component. The “Vee” is “iterative” in all aspects of the “design process, from high-level 
issues such as stakeholder requirements to low-level issues such as component design.” 
This is “accomplished by moving vertically in the Vee over short increments of time” 
within the ‘Vee.’ The “right-hand side of the ‘Vee’” typically contains activities 
 14 
involving the “assembly of lower level components into higher level components, and the 
assembly of high-level components into the system.” For the purposes of this project the 
“right-hand side of the ‘Vee’” was used for verification and validation activities as seen 
in Figure 6 and Figure 7  (Buede 2011). 
 
Figure 5.  Systems Engineering “Vee” (source: Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011)  
2. Tailored Approach 
The tailored systems engineering approach used consists of a modified traditional 
systems engineering “Vee” model that ensured all stakeholder inputs, needs, and 
requirements were included in the final project solution. The overall continuity of the 
systems engineering process is shown in Figure 6.  This view displays the engineering 
work conducted (or to be conducted) over previous, current, and probable future MIW 
projects. The diagram has been nicknamed the “telephone cord Vee” and its purpose is to 
show that the previous MIW team (2014) completed its entire iteration of the systems 
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engineering process in fulfillment of their project objectives prior to providing the 
configuration recommendation to the current MIW team (2015) as the input or starting 
place for the MIW 2015 project specific systems engineering process. The systems 
engineering continuity approach shows the iterative process through each individual 
project. Each iteration does not necessarily use the outputs from the previous project for 
the inputs to the follow-on project. The continuity method intends to show the previously 
completed systems engineering (SE) “Vee” while showing the progression of the SE 
process through the various iterations of each project. System verification and validation 
consist of model functionality verification and validation activities with respect to system 
requirements and stakeholder needs. Each iterative “Vee” provides a recommended 
configuration as an output for the next project’s system engineering process input. 
 
Figure 6.  Overview of SE “Vee” Continuity 
This current project followed a tailored SE process, using some of the 
recommended configuration outputs from the previous group, but tailoring the majority 
of the project based upon updated stakeholder inputs and needs. Figure 7 shows the 
tailored engineering process that begins with the configuration recommendations 
received as the output of the previous MIW 2014 process and proceeds through the right 
hand side activities of the SE “Vee” to include stakeholder analysis and need input, 
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system requirement development, system analysis and architecting, component design, 
and finally modeling and simulation. The right-hand side activities of the SE “Vee” 
consisted of the verification and validation of the activities on the left-hand side of the SE 
“Vee.” The output is a stand-alone model that satisfies stakeholder’s requirements and 
that can be used to evaluate a current MCM problem. The output, or solution of the 
“Vee,” will also include a recommendation for potential follow-up work to be conducted 
by a future Capstone team who will use some, all, or none of the recommendations based 
upon their tasking and stakeholder inputs.   
 
Figure 7.  Tailored SE “Vee” 
In the first activity, stakeholder wants and needs were obtained through research, 
stakeholder inputs, and stakeholder provided system requirements. This information 
determined the basis for the SE process and ultimately the output at the other end of the 
SE “Vee.” These stakeholder requirements along with other systems engineering analysis 
results (operational concept, input output models, context analysis, and functional 
analysis) were translated into the top level system requirements. Systems architecting 
used the wants, needs, and requirements to create a high-level system design satisfying 
stakeholder requirements. Component design consisted of the modification of the 
individual model elements that existed in the original model as well as any additional 
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elements that were added to bring about the additional capability, as determined in the 
systems architecting phase, to meet the requirements determined during the systems 
requirements phase. Modeling and simulation with known data points was performed to 
ensure that a successfully modified model, codenamed the autonomous remote mine-
hunting simulation (ARMS) model, existed and functioned according to the system 
requirements. Activities on the right-hand side of the “Vee” consisted of the verification 
and validation of model functionality and ensuring that the outputs were consistent with 
all left-hand SE “Vee” activities. This included model “runs for record” to satisfy project 
data collection purposes, any possible excursions that arose during the execution of this 
project, and the configuration recommendation for potential future project work.  
The specific activities listed above are detailed within this chapter and is 
illustrated in Figure 8.  The below terminology referring to systems engineering activities 
is used to be consistent with that used in the previous MIW project deliverables to 
include the project report, but map to the terms used in the tailored SE “Vee” above. 
Requirements analysis equates to “system requirements,” functional analysis is used in 
place of “system analysis” and “system architecting,” physical synthesis captures 
“component design.”  
 
Figure 8.  Application of Tailored SE Process (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
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The systems engineering approach for this iteration of the MIW project largely 
followed and mirrored the previous approach that was used by the previous MCM team, 
but was tailored to address the iterative nature of this project, not only within the project 
specific SE “Vee” but also within the overall continuity of SE “Vees.”  
B. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
The tailored SE process began with the receipt of stakeholder input which flowed 
into the requirements analysis phase as illustrated in Figure 9.  The requirements analysis 
phase consisted of performing a stakeholder analysis that would define the initial need 
and form a problem statement. Stakeholder input was combined with existing 
capabilities, as well as proposed capabilities, to develop requirements based off of 
stakeholder input, stakeholder analysis, and relevant literature reviews and SME 
feedback. 
 
Figure 9.  Requirements Analysis (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
During stakeholder analysis the team received feedback from various MIW 
subject matter experts which allowed for the refinement of the primitive needs statement 
into an effective needs statement. Functional decomposition and the development of 
operational scenarios flowed into the development of relevant functional requirements. 
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Once the high-level functional requirements were formed a capability needs statement, 
problem statement, high-level functional decomposition, and a representative operational 
scenario were output to the functional analysis block. 
 
C. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional analysis consisted of functional decomposition of the existing model 
inherited from the previous MIW team in order to understand it. This included the need 
for a deep understanding of how variables and other values were passed from block to 
block within the model. This information was necessary to determine a path forward that 
would lead to the successful implementation of proposed model modifications.  
 
Figure 10.  Functional Analysis (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
To better understand how the model was constructed, and to understand how the 
model should function to meet stakeholder requirements, discussions about the model 
were held with the primary modeling SME from the previous MIW team as well as other 
MIW SMEs to include those directly involved with the MK18 Mod 2 system. This 
allowed the team to better understand the many processes necessary to successfully 
conduct the comparative analysis study per stakeholder requirements and within the 
context of the existing model. Outputs of functional analysis were used as inputs to the 
physical synthesis block. These outputs consisted of low-level functional decomposition 
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and functional flow block diagrams (FFBDs) as well as the planned modifications to the 
existing model in order to satisfy project goals.  
D. PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS  
Planned modifications to the existing model were performed during the physical 
synthesis phase. Detailed in Figure 11, this phase used the low-level functional 
decomposition, operational scenarios, and the developed functional flow block diagrams 
from the functional analysis phase as inputs. The physical synthesis phase consisted of 
additional SME and stakeholder feedback as well as the implementation of proposed 
model modifications.  
 
Figure 11.  Physical Synthesis (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
Limitations in the modeling software as well as limits in the existing model 
slowed the advance of this phase of the project. The scope of the project was evaluated 
and simplified to facilitate model modification utilizing two, instead of four, MK18 Mod 
2 search assets. The limitations persisted even after this reduction in scope. With these 
limitations in mind a modification to the forward path was developed and proposed to 
project leadership. The proposed modification allowed for the projection of data collected 
from a functioning version of the model to be used to provide simulated results that 
would far exceed any data provided by any working version of the model, with either two 
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or four MK18 Mod 2 search assets. The output of the physical synthesis processes were a 
complete, ARMS model that produced resultant data utilized within the comparative 
analysis portion of the project. 
 
E. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
Outputs from physical synthesis were the input into the analysis of alternatives to 
support the required analysis of provided performance data and simulation output data. 
The ARMS model was used to perform the modeling simulation “runs for record” based 
off the previously performed design of experiments. With this data the team performed 
the performance and cost comparisons of interest to project stakeholders.  
During the progression of the project an analysis of alternatives (AoA) was 
conducted to compare the modeling and evaluation approaches to be implemented during 
the study. The team was provided an ExtendSim model as the baseline for study 
extension. Multiple modification methods and approaches were compared by the team 
prior to implementation of the chosen course of action (COA). Using the approach 
modeled in Figure 12, the analysis COA options were identified and evaluated for 
consideration for use within the study.   
 
 
Figure 12.  Analysis of Alternatives (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
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Inputs to the analysis included the provided computer based model and the 
performance parameters of the systems being evaluated in particular the key MOE/MOP 
of ACRS and percent clearance. The controlling factors of the analysis were the time 
available to complete the study in the allotted capstone period, the limitations imposed by 
utilizing an existing model and having only generalized unclassified data. Outputs of the 
analysis provide a comparison of the overall hunt and mission effectiveness including 
cost and risk factors. Preparation for the analysis included collecting data and information 
from stakeholders and that was derived during the literature review, expanding upon this 
knowledge to create a design of experiment (DOE) for evaluating the model strategies to 
predict the operational effectiveness. Performance of the overall analysis then included 
the implementation of the selected COA and generated sample data to produce the 
resultant recommendation. Through the application of a rigorous approach to engineering 
problem-solving the team worked to employ a DOE scenario that operated in a 
systematic manner. The team applied these “principles and techniques at the data 
collection stage so as to ensure the generation of valid, defensible, and supportable 
engineering conclusions”  (NIST 2013, 1) presented in this report. 
F. MODELING METHODOLOGY 
As described above, an AoA was performed to compare the methods available for 
use in assessing the current RMS versus the MK18 Mod 2 system. The results of 
simulating an RMS and the MK18 Mod 2 system were compared against identical 
minefields. In the case for the MK18 Mod 2, it was simulated and compared to the RMS 
with 11 different combinations. The combinations of MK18 Mod 2s are described in 
Table 1.  For example, the first combination consisted of a single MK18 Mod 2 released 
into the minefield from a single rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB). The second 
combination consisted of two MK18 Mod 2s hunting and detecting mines simultaneously 
launched from a single RHIB. The third combination consisted of three MK18 Mod 2s 
hunting and detecting mines simultaneously launched from two separate RHIBs. The 
output metrics from the simulations were analyzed to see which platforms were able to 
fulfill the requirements of the study. Since the 2014 MIW team championed ExtendSim 
over map aware non-uniform automata (MANA) through their AoA, the 2015 MIW team 
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continued to utilize ExtendSim to simulate the RMS and MK18 Mod 2 configurations. A 
description of ExtendSim is included in Chapter VI and the evaluation is extended in 
Appendix A. 
Table 1.   MK18 Mod 2 Combinations 
Configuration Platform Transportation 
1 UUV MK18 Mod 2 1 RHIB launched from LCS 
2 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 1 RHIB launched from LCS 
3 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 2 RHIBs launched from LCS 
4 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 2 RHIBs launched from LCS 
5 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 3 RHIBs launched from LCS 
6 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 3 RHIBs launched from LCS 
7 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 4 RHIBs launched from LCS 
8 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 4 RHIBs launched from LCS 
9 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 5 RHIBs launched from LCS 
10 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 5 RHIBs launched from LCS 
12 UUVs MK18 Mod 2 6 RHIBs launched from LCS 
 
Of concern was the ability of the model to accommodate the addition of multiple 
search vehicles operating in parallel and alternative means within the project constraints 
while producing meaningful data and determining the proper approach to accomplish that 
goal. The team initially performed limited reverse engineering of the software modules 
comprising the model to identify areas for which the model could be extended to support 
the current and potentially future studies of MIW. Using the gathered information several 
COAs were developed and an analysis of the alternative approaches was conducted to 
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determine the appropriate methodology, followed by implementation of select code 
changes and simulation runs for evaluation of suitability prior to committing the model 
code changes. Alternatives were measured against criteria and selected or rejected for 
further development until a single modeling approach was selected. 
During the evaluation two differing approaches were initially developed into 
multiple working models for evaluation over the course of several weeks. Through the 
use of controlled input data to calibrate the model, runs were completed for comparison 
of key MOEs to the baseline model. The results of these calibration runs exposed 
additional issues that were traced over multiple model iterations to the arrival time of the 
identified mine-like contact (MILCO) into the post mission analysis (PMA) portion of 
both models. Further modification of the models to batch the MILCO was implemented 
and evaluated by the team while other strategies were developed in accordance with the 
previously listed criteria. It was determined that although the models produced expected 
values for the critical MOE of number of mines neutralized, achieving the result was due 
to the implementation of artificial delays in the model which would not be present in an 
operational scenario. Due to this finding one of the model approaches was determined no 
longer to be a feasible approach and was abandoned in favor of re-writing the PMA code 
as the long term solution for use in continued studies. In conjunction with the recoding 
efforts and discussions with NMAWC MIW requirements N8 Richard Kimmel, an 
alternative approach to producing meaningful data was determined (Richard Kimmel, 
personal comm.) which would focus on the effectiveness of the hunt portion of the MK18 
to the RMS and legacy systems for comparison using the results of a single hunt asset. 
The approach was deemed as acceptable by the stakeholders because the airborne 
neutralization assets were of known performance characteristics and consistent among the 
comparative systems. Of primary interest was the determination of the number of MK18s 
which meet and/or exceed the hunt effectiveness of the RMS and legacy configurations 
and associated costs to allow for a safer search mission by removing the human from the 
mine field (Richard Kimmel, personal comm.). 
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There exists many different methods and models detailing the systems 
engineering process. Waterfall, spiral, and the systems engineering “Vee” models all 
have benefits as well as drawbacks. The waterfall model, being somewhat restrictive, was 
not chosen for use in this project. The spiral model was intended to fix the inflexibility of 
the waterfall model through the development of multiple prototypes throughout each 
phase iteration. Due to time restrictions and deliverable requirements this model was not 
chosen. The systems engineering “Vee” model came the closest to satisfying the project 
needs but was still required slight modification to address all aspects of this project. Of 
the many models that are available to the systems engineer, there is not always a model in 
existence that meets the needs of every project. Such was the case for this project. While 
the typical SE “Vee” model was somewhat sufficient, it did not meet all the requirements 
necessary. The need to show project continuity and carryover was required to correctly 
characterize the process utilized. To correct this, it was determined that using a modified 
SE “Vee” model in an iterative fashion, similar to that of the spiral model (essentially 
placing iterative SE “Vees” in a row) would satisfy project objectives. This method 
allowed for the current iteration of the MIW project (MIW 2015) to accept 
recommendations from the previous MIW team (2014), proceed through its own SE 
“Vee” and provide recommendations to a future MIW team.  
The systems engineering activities of requirements analysis, functional analysis, 
physical synthesis, and analysis of alternatives were conducted as part of the systems 
engineering process and mirrored that of the previous MIW project (2014). These 
activities identified relevant stakeholders to identify the primitive need develop a need 
and problem statement. From this problem statement, a functional decomposition was 
conducted in the functional analysis phase. In the physical synthesis phase, relevant 
stakeholder and SME feedback was taken and proposed modified path forward was 
identified and executed. Analysis of alternatives (AoA) conducted a design of 
experiments from which data was generated for analysis. A life-cycle cost (LCC) analysis 
was also performed in this phase to compare hunt effectiveness with the most cost 
 26 
effective configuration. Of importance during the AoA phase was the need to develop a 
modified method for getting the data require for analysis. 
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III. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
In conjunction with the literature review and analysis of the 2014 MIW model, the 
team conducted additional research of operational and developmental activities in order 
to develop the preliminary problem definition and scope for the ARMS model. Through 
further study and feedback from the core MIW SMEs and advisors, a set of primitive 
needs was developed and further refined into an effective needs statement. The MIW 
team’s process continued to evolve the effective needs into a detailed problem statement, 
in line with the project’s technical and time constraints to scope the effort accordingly.  
The content of this chapter details the processes used to recognize relevant roles 
of the primary and secondary MIW stakeholders, then identify, analyze, prioritize and 
transform their collective primitive needs into a common effective need. The process is 
further detailed in the methods the team used to transform the stakeholder’s recognized 
mission capability need and effective need under the project’s constraints into a concise 
problem statement bounding the study’s scope. 
A. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 
Since this project built upon the previous work of the NPS MIW Team 2014, a 
limited stakeholder identification process was implemented. The performance of a 
stakeholder analysis ensures that the needs of all stakeholders are given suitable 
consideration in relation to influence, impact or importance during the performance of the 
SE process. This project’s additional stakeholders, combined with those previously 
identified, were those entities discovered during the research of the LCS MIW MP as a 
replacement of the MCM and the potential inclusion of the MK18 Mod 2 as a supplement 
or replacement of aspects of that MP. 
As stakeholders’ needs drive system requirements and ultimately design, all 
reasonable attempts to identify and capture the desires of the stakeholders during the 
analysis process were made to allow for the accurate description of the problem area 
bounded by the project constraints. The following steps adapted from the International 
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Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) processes were performed in the execution 
of the stakeholder analysis as follows: 
1. Identify potential stakeholders and their interests in MIW, LCS MP and 
the MK18 Mod 2. 
2. Classify the potential stakeholders in accordance to impact and influence. 
3. Determine and rank first and second order stakeholder priorities. 
4. Identify the primitive needs of the stakeholders. 
5. Analyze the collective primitive needs and determine the effective need. 
6. Transform the effective need into requirements and a preliminary problem 
statement. 
7. Provide the preliminary problem statement to stakeholders and advisors 
for concurrence and feedback (iterated as necessary to refine statement). 
8. Include stakeholder feedback into formalized requirements. 
The initial list of stakeholders for this project was inherited from the NPS MIW 
Team 2014 project and expanded by the MIW Team 2015 to include those associated or 
interested with the development, deployment and sustainment of the MK18 Mod 2. 
Research into the stakeholder’s involvement of MIW and the MK18 Mod 2 and feedback 
from other stakeholders resulted in an adjusted list of stakeholders, with the classification 
or prioritization of some stakeholders becoming less influential. This re-ordering 
occurred through evaluation of the stakeholder’s level of interaction with MIW as 
performed by the LCS or the MK18 Mod 2, and categorized as; internal, first-order or 
second-order. An internal stakeholder is classified as an entity whose interaction with the 
LCS MIW or MK18 Mod 2 systems is direct. Those stakeholders determined to have 
interactions with the LCS MIW or MK18 Mod 2 mission, but not direct interaction with 
the system are classified as first-order. Stakeholders whom have no direct interaction 
with the system or mission except through first-order stakeholders have been classified as 
second-order. The first-order and second-order stakeholders comprise the boundary 
stakeholders. After the internally and boundary stakeholders were classified, the 
relationships between the stakeholders and the MCM systems were analyzed (Frank et al. 
2014). 
The ranking and prioritization of the stakeholders allows for the determination of 
critical system parameters by the SE team. In order to perform the prioritization of the 
stakeholders, the level of influence on the life cycle cost and operational needs of the 
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system is considered which aids in resolving conflicts of needs if required. In the design 
of a system, stakeholder prioritization is a key attribute in determining those elements 
which shape the development of the architecture, acquisition strategy and operation of the 
system (INCOSE 2010). Once identified as a key stakeholder they were categorized as 
primary or secondary with the needs of the primary stakeholders requiring satisfaction 
and those of the secondary satisfied as possible. The primitive needs of the stakeholders 
were discussed, MOEs analyzed, and evaluated by the MIW 2015 team and stakeholders 
to refine and produce the resultant effective needs and problem statements for this 
research. 
The stakeholder’s needs, as expressed in the problem statement, allowed for the 
team to develop and derive the project requirements in accordance with the previously 
determined scope. The established requirements allowed for the study of current MCM 
capabilities to be adequately measured against modeled future capabilities to satisfy the 
needs of the MIW community. The MIW community is comprised of both primary and 
secondary stakeholders, dependent upon both their interactions within the MIW 
community and involvement with this project. The listing of stakeholders, their 
categorization and description of MIW or project involvement is detailed in Table 2  























Involvement in MIW 





1st Order Primary Responsible for 
assessing requirements 
for naval expeditionary 
warfare missions and 
programs, including 
MIW. Also responsible 
for determining 
characteristics and 
structure for all MIW 
ships. (“[Office of the 
Chief of Naval 
Operations] OPNAV 
95” 2013) 
Interested in capabilities 
assessments and 
recommendations for 
enhancements to shipboard, 
deployable vehicles. 
Particularly interested in 
assessments that help 
prioritize future system 
acquisition based on total 
capability delivered vs. cost. 





1st Order Primary Develops doctrine and 
TTPs. Articulates the 









Interested in the 
performance of emerging 
MIW capabilities as stated 
in personal meeting 3 
August 2015. Of particular 
interest were the number of 
MK18 Mod 2 devices 
required to equal the 
effective ACRS of current 
MCM operations. 
NSWC PC Internal Primary Conduct research, 
development, test and 
evaluation (T&E), in-
service support of MIW 
systems, mines, naval 
special warfare 
systems, and other 
systems primarily 
occurring in coastal 
regions. (Naval Sea 
Systems Command 
n.d.—b) 
Interested in all aspects of 
MIW. As stated in 9 May 
2014 meeting and in 
personal communication 
dated 15 May 2014, 
particularly interested in 
increasing the ACRS for 




Internal Primary Specializes in ship 
design & integration. 
(Naval Sea Systems 
Command, n.d.—c) 
Interested in requirements 
for ship designs and 
equipment integration that 













Involvement in MIW 





Internal Primary Responsible for 
acquiring and 
maintaining the littoral 
mission capabilities of 
the LCS class including 
programs to support 
MIW (Secretary of the 
Navy n.d.) 
Interested in capabilities 
assessments and 
recommendations for 
enhancements to shipboard, 
deployable vehicles 
PEO Ships Internal Primary Responsible for 
executing the 
development and 
procurement of all 
destroyers, amphibious 
ships, special mission 
and support ships, and 
special warfare craft. 
(Naval Sea Systems 
Command n.d.—d) 
Interested in capabilities 
assessments and 
recommendations for 
enhancements to shipboard, 
deployable vehicles 
NPS Project Primary Conducting research 
and development to 




prospective SEs for 
DOD. 
Interested in developing 
new strategies and system 
for MIW Operations. 
Interested in developing 




Project Primary Primary MIW expert 
consultant for NPS led 
study. 
Interested in providing 
expert advice for the MIW 
Team to ensure the 
development of quality, 
useful research-based 
product. 
SSC PAC MK18 
Mod 2 program 
support 
1st Order Secondary Responsible for MK18 
system development in 
order to meet N95 
requirements. 
Interested in developing 
capability to meet emerging 
requirements. Developing 
new technologies to further 




Internal Secondary Operational 
involvement 
Interested in the best 
equipment and methods to 
destroy enemy sea mines. 
PMS 340: Naval 
Special Warfare 
Program Office 
Internal Secondary Involved in the 
development of systems 
and procedures for 
naval special warfare 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the 
War Fighters with the best 
equipment and training 













Involvement in MIW 






Internal Secondary Involved in the 
development of systems 
and procedures for 
remote mine hunting. 
Interested in outfitting the 
War Fighters with the best 
equipment and training 







Internal Secondary Involved in the 
development of systems 
and procedures for 
maritime surveillance 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the 
War Fighters with the best 
equipment and training 
possible to accomplish the 
mission. 
PMS 420: LCS 
Mission Modules 
Program Office 
Internal Secondary Involved in the 
development of systems 
and procedures for LCS 
Mission Module 
Systems. 
Interested in outfitting the 
War Fighters with the best 
equipment and training 
possible to accomplish the 
mission. 
PMS 495: MIW 
Systems 
Internal Secondary Involved in the 
development, fielding, 
and –n-service support 
for all mining and mine 
countermeasure 
systems in the areas of 
mine hunting, 
minesweeping, mine 
neutralization, and the 
development of mines 
for offensive MIW. 
(PMS 495 Mine 
Warfare Program 
Office 2008) 
Interested in developing the 
highest value MIW systems 
possible. 
Nation’s Allies Boundary Secondary Direct stakeholders as 
mines can affect any 
allied nation with 
littoral coastline. 
Interested in protecting their 
naval and commercial 






Boundary Secondary Involved in the 
development of systems 
and procedures for 
maritime anti-terrorism 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the 
War Fighters with the best 
equipment and training 







Boundary Secondary Involved in the 
development of systems 
and procedures for 
maritime surveillance 
operations. 
Interested in outfitting the 
War Fighters with the best 
equipment and training 













Involvement in MIW 




1st Order Secondary Involved with the 
determination of system 
effectiveness through 
the conduct of 
capability assessment 
analyses for war 
fighting and war 
fighting support. Also 




upgrades to capabilities. 
Lastly, interested in the 
development and 
validation of analytic 
tools and techniques. 
(“N81 Alignment 
Warfare” 2006) 
Interested in methods to 
enhance and/or upgrade 
existing MIW scenario and 
war fighting models 
N96 (Surface 
Warfare) 
1st Order Secondary Responsible for 
determining 
requirements for 
surface combatants and 
support ships, as well as 
to coordinate, 
supervise, and execute 
Navy shipbuilding for 
above surface 
combatant ships. 
(“OPNAV N96” 2013) 
Interested in developing 
improvement modifications 
to the LCS current design 
Table 2 (continued) 
 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Stakeholder desires were analyzed in order to develop the primitive need. The 
primitive need is the need stated by the stakeholders and is often their perception of what 
is needed to solve a perceived problem. While the primitive need may encompass the 
eventual solution, more analysis is necessary to determine the correct path forward. The 
first step in analyzing stakeholders’ actual problem is the development of the effective 
need. The effective need is a broader statement of needs that should identify what the 
stakeholder really wants that solves the actual problem. The capability need statement 
 34 
defines the capability needed in order to solve the stakeholders’ problem. Finally, the 
problem statement defines the real, overarching problem, based on research into 
stakeholders’ primitive needs that requires solution. 
1. Primitive Need Summary 
During the weekly meetings of Team MIW 2015 and their capstone advisors, 
various stakeholders, including RDML (Ret.) Rick Williams, expressed the desire to 
compare the MK18 Mod 2 mine detection system to the LCS MCM RMS mine detection 
system in order determine potential methods of increasing the LCS MCM capability. The 
main purpose of this comparison was not only to determine the most effective methods of 
utilizations, but in order to determine which capabilities provide the best value. The MIW 
community wants to compare the developmental MK18 Mod 2, and other autonomous 
mine detection systems to the RMS used in the LCS MCM Mission Package in order to 
determine relative effectiveness and recommended methods of use for effective and 
efficient mine detection and elimination and inform future force structure decisions. 
2. Effective Need Summary 
Based on the results of the literature review and stakeholder analysis, the 
primitive need was refined to the effective need. The U.S. Navy and its allies continue to 
study and develop new capabilities in order to more effectively combat mines laid by an 
array of enemy forces. A major focus of this has been the removal of warships and 
humans from the actual mined space (Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine 
Warfare 2009). In doing so, the U.S. Navy and its allies have expressed difficulty in 
comparing legacy MCM 1 capabilities with the new capabilities provided by the LCS 
MCM Mission Package and other emerging technologies (Frank et al. 2014). The U.S. 
Navy needs to have this comparison capability in order to ensure that new and future 
capabilities provide effects as good as or better than the legacy capabilities for equal or 
lower cost. 
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3. Capability Need Statement 
The U.S. Navy and its coalition partners need the ability to compare advanced and 
evolving Mine Warfare capabilities to baseline as well as against legacy MIW 
capabilities in terms of merit and value. This includes programmatic, operational and 
budgetary considerations. 
4. Problem Statement 
The MCM 1 Avenger class vessels are planned to be completely retired by 2024 
(Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare 2009). The LCS MCM MP is the 
intended successor and will overlap the legacy systems. The graphical depiction in Figure 
13 is intended to be representative of this overlap, but it is not known at this time what 
the real overlap will be, as delays in development and acquisition continue to push back 
initial operating capability (IOC) of the LCS MCM MP (United States Government 
Accountability Office 2014). In addition, it is unknown what total capability will be 
available to conduct mine warfare with the LCS MCM MP, how to employ it, how it 
compares to existing capability, which envisioned elements provide the best value, or 
what the final cost will be. The MIW community needs to develop a comprehensive 
comparative solution to clearly define the gaps between legacy, future, and projected 
MCM capabilities while providing recommendations involving effectiveness and value 
for the conduct of sound tradeoff decisions.  
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Figure 13.  Notional Legacy and Future System Overlap 
C. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
The operational scenario is discussed in detail within Chapter IV. 
D. REQUIREMENTS 
Requirements are the statements used “to set up the standards and measurement 
tools for judging the success of the system” (Buede 2011, 153). In essence, this is the 
distillation of stakeholder mission needs into clear statements that can be used to 
formulate the specific design of the system. Requirements are hierarchical in nature, with 
the highest level of requirements being mission based and the lowest level intended for 
detailed design work of individual configuration items (Buede 2011). 
A goal of the MIW Team 2014 and 2015 Capstone teams was to design and build 
a model for simulation in order to fulfill stakeholder needs. The goal of the MIW Team 
2015 requirements process was to develop the high level requirements needed to guide 
model design in order to ensure they fulfilled stakeholder desires to quantitatively 
compare the MK18 Mod 2 to the current LCS MCM MP RMS. 
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The MIW 2014 Capstone group created a model that conducted simulation 
comparisons of the legacy MCM 1 Avenger vs. the LCS MCM MP in various 
configurations (Frank et al. 2014). The initial intent was to reuse this model if at all 
possible. To maximize the usefulness of any model extensions, the following overall 
requirements were stated. 
R.0 The system shall simulate an operational scenario of the legacy MCM 1 
Avenger and the MK18 Mod 2 in specified configurations. 
• R.1 The model outputs shall be comparable to MIW Capstone 2014 
outputs. 
• R.2 The model shall simulate the MK18 Mod 2 parameters in place of the 
LCS RMS.   
Requirement 1 is necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with the 
previous capstone conclusions. This desire was stated as a means to maximize the 
information that can be extracted from the combination of the two studies. Requirement 2 
is the focus area for this capstone based on the stated desires of stakeholders. These two 
high level requirements formed the basis of the MIW 2015 Capstone team’s efforts. As 
the first requirement is a need to maintain backward comparability, MIW 2015 Capstone 
group needed to incorporate the originating requirements from the MIW 2014 Capstone 
group. These are presented in their entirety herein. 
• “R.1 An unclassified model shall be developed to determine the 
operational effectiveness of the LCS versus MCM capabilities 
• R.1.1 The model shall take unclassified inputs for various 
performance parameters for the LCS and MCM to enable 
sensitivity Analysis 
• R.1.1.1 The model shall use best estimates of input factors 
in cases when real values are unavailable 
• R.1.2 The model shall identify parameters with high predictive 
power (relative to other parameters) 
• R.1.3 The model shall use an operationally relevant situation as the 
basis of comparison, focusing on system effectiveness in a SLOC 
scenario 
• R.2 The model shall provide quantitative estimates of overall mine 
clearing effectiveness 
• R.2.1 The model shall produce a metric of ACRS 
• R.2.2 The model shall produce a metric of percent clearance to 
evaluate the mine hunting effectiveness” (Frank et al. 2014, 56). 
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Taking these requirements and combining them with our own originating 
requirements results in the following complete list of originating requirements. 
• R.1 The model outputs shall be comparable to MIW Capstone 2014 
outputs. 
• R.1.1 The model shall use a SLOC 10 nautical mile (NM) X 10 
NM area as the basis of its operational comparisons.   
• R.1.2 The model shall provide quantitative estimates of overall 
mine clearance effectiveness. 
• R.1.2.1 The model shall record the data to enable the 
calculation of ACRS. 
• R.1.2.2 The model shall record the data to enable the 
calculation of percent mine clearance. 
• R.2 The model shall simulate the MK18 Mod 2 parameters in place of the 
LCS RMS.   
• R.2.1 An unclassified model shall be developed or modified in 
order to determine the operational effectiveness of the LCS MCM 
Inc 1 RMS versus the MK18 Mod 2. 
• R.2.1.1 The model shall take unclassified inputs for 
relevant performance parameters for the LCS RMS and the 
MK18 Mod 2. 
• R.2.1.1.1 The model shall use best estimates of 
input factors when real values are not available. 
• R2.2 The model shall incorporate any additional functions 
necessary for the operation of the MK18 Mod 2 not required by the 
LCS RMS in previous simulations. 
Once the originating requirements were determined, these were transformed into 
top-level system requirements. These are the requirements that are used to design the 
system in order to satisfy the originating (stakeholder’s) requirements (Buede 2011). For 
both MIW Team 2014 and 2015, the functional and physical analysis was used to 
generate the parameters that the model needs to describe in order to effectively model 
system operation (Frank et al. 2014). As the simulation was adapted from the previous 
capstone team, once again the system requirements were adapted from MIW Team 2014. 
As in their model, there are five top-level requirements developed for the model. The 




Table 3.   Requirements (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
Number Requirement Type / MOE Mapping 
1.0 The simulation shall enable the determination of the 
ACRS for each MCM configuration in the 
performance of mine hunting.  
Top-Level 
1.1 The simulation shall represent the time required to 
perform each mine hunting function within the mine 
hunting operation: travel, detect, classify, identify, 
reacquire, and neutralize for each MCM configuration. 
ACRS 
1.2 The simulation shall provide the data to enable the 
calculation of ACRS. 
ACRS 
2.0 The simulation shall model the effectiveness of each 
mine hunting function. 
Top-Level 
2.1 The simulation shall calculate and store the 
effectiveness of each mine hunting function. 
Percent 
Clearance  
2.2 The simulation shall calculate and output the overall 
mine hunting effectiveness in terms of the number of 
mines cleared, number of mines remaining, and the 
number of non-mines that were neutralized.  
Percent 
Clearance 
3.0 The simulation shall contain models of the mine 
hunting sequence of events for the different 
configurations. 
Top-Level 
3.1 The simulation shall represent each of the MCM 
configuration’s mine hunting functions: search, detect, 
classify, identify, reacquire, and neutralize. 
ACRS and  
Percent 
Clearance 
3.2 The simulation shall represent the minefield size and 
location for use in the effectiveness and ACRS 
calculations. 
ACRS and  
Percent 
Clearance 
3.3 The simulation shall transition the state and mine 
hunting results of the previous function to the 
subsequent function IAW PEO LMW Instruction 
3370.1A.  
ACRS and  
Percent 
Clearance 
4.0 The simulation shall support setting and modifying the 
listed performance parameters without requiring 
modifying the simulation. 
Top-Level 
4.1 The simulation shall import specified input parameters 
without requiring modifications to the code. 
Non-Functional 
4.2 The simulation shall support the export of the resulting 
effectiveness and time-to-complete parameters to a 
form that can be analyzed by statistical software 
products such as Excel and Minitab. 
Non-Functional 
4.3 The simulation shall be developed in a modular 
method that allows for each function to be replaced. 
Non-Functional 
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Number Requirement Type / MOE Mapping 
5.0 The simulation shall include documentation that 




5.1 The simulation documentation shall include full 
descriptions of all changes to the code, including any 
new input or output parameters, code additions, 
deletions and subtractions.   
Non-Functional 
  
The first top level requirement, R.1, specified the project need to calculate the 
ACRS for every given tested configuration and all parameter inputs. This is necessary to 
ensure that the differing parametric inputs can be compared using the MOEs that were 
previously identified. R.1.1 and R.1.2 further specify what data needs to be collected in 
order for the simulation to provide the information necessary to calculate the ACRS. 
R.1.2 differs from MIW Team 2014 as the simulation does not calculate the ACRS 
directly. This was done later using other tools such as Microsoft Excel and Minitab as 
appropriate for conducting statistical analysis. 
The second top level requirement, R.2, specified the need for the model to collect 
effectiveness data for each phase of the mine hunting operation. Once again, the lower 
level requirements specify exactly what is done and how it is done in order to achieve this 
top-level requirement. The percent effectiveness is not calculated directly by the model, 
but R.2.2 specifies what information needs to be output to allow for this calculation to 
occur during data analysis. 
The third top level requirement specifies the need for the model to simulate the 
specific functional differences between tested configurations. In this study, the MK18 
and the RMS are the specific differences being studied. Where the RMS is launched 
directly from the LCS and transits to the search area, the MK18 is launched from a RHIB 
that is launched from the LCS. These specific differences must be modeled in the 
simulation. The lower level functions specify further refinement on how this is done. 
The fourth top level requirement specifies the need for the model to accept 
differing parameters in order to see how changes to these parameters effect overall 
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mission effectiveness. As previously stated, these simulations are not being conducted 
with real data as it is either classified or unavailable. Therefore, ranges of data were used 
to simulate likely values. Changing the simulation for each parametric permutation is 
labor intensive, therefore it was determined that a need existed for the simulation to 
accept values from either a database or spreadsheet. This allowed for the rapid variance 
of input parameters supporting a Design of Experiments methodology. The top level 
requirement is decomposed to provide further guidance on how to accomplish this task. 
The fifth top level requirement specifies the need to document the model and how 
it works. As this is an existing model, there is already a 500 page document detailing its 
setup and use. Our requirement focuses this effort to documentation of changes that are 
made to the simulation from the original as the existing document is already very 
comprehensive. 
E. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
This chapter identified the stakeholders and their desires to compare the MK18 
Mod 2 mine detection vehicle and the LCS MCM MP Inc 1 RMS, defined the full 
underlying problem and created requirements to fulfill the needs of the stakeholders. 
These requirements were then taken to guide the model development and modification to 
meet those stakeholder needs. Other necessary work that aided this effort was the 
identification of ACRS and percent clearance as the primary metrics defined in Chapter I 
for comparison, and the definition of an operational scenario within which to compare the 
desired assets. 
 42 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 43 
IV. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Navy, as necessitated by Strategic, Joint, and Navy guidance, provides 
six core capabilities in order to support National Security objectives. These are forward 
presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) (U.S. Navy 2010). The U.S. Navy requires a robust 
MCM capability in order to ensure access to provide these capabilities. This chapter 
discusses the operational concepts and scenarios used to develop the model and 
simulation. 
A. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 
1. Operating Area 
Around 90% of the world’s trade moves by sea (Department of the Navy 2015). 
About a third of world trade moves through the Straits of Malacca, while one-half of all 
oil moves through it (Evers and Gerke 2006). A third more oil moves through the Straits 
of Hormuz than the Straits of Malacca (Evers and Gerke 2006). A defining point of trade 
choke points is geography. These are locations that provide a transit path from one part of 
the world to another that is along the shortest route, or, as in the case of the Straits of 
Hormuz, the only route. These straits generally consist of largely deeper water (200 feet 
or greater) with a mile or more of navigable water at the narrowest point. Much of the 
straits are significantly wider. Any action by a state or non-state actor to threaten these 
choke points could have devastating effects on the world economy. The utilization of 
mines would be particularly threatening, difficult to detect, and damaging to international 
trade and global confidence. 
In considering the greatest and most time consuming mine threat U.S. MCM 
forces could face, MCM experts presented a scenario in which a 10 x 10 NM grid, 
centered directly on the shipping channel, was suspected of containing mines and needed 
to be cleared. In order to provide an unbiased comparison, water depth was assumed to be 
200 feet or greater, and only bottom mines were considered as this was the mine type 
most consistently comparable across the various configurations. Bottom mines are 
 44 
generally effective to depths of 200 feet, and this is also representative of shipping 
channel depts. This scenario is especially realistic when combined with rising-type 
bottom mines. 
2. MCM Configurations 
a. Legacy 
The legacy MCM configuration consists of the MCM 1 Avenger class vessels as 
surface assets paired with the CH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters for airborne MCM. The 
MCM 1 class vessels utilize sonar to detect and classify mine-like contacts and follow up 
with a tethered neutralization system to identify and neutralize. The Avenger class ships 
conduct their missions from within the minefield and are designed to mitigate detection 
by influence mines. This includes wooden hulled construction and engine quieting 
technologies. These vessels also utilize minesweeping capabilities to cut moored mines 
from their anchors or detonate influence type mines. A limiting factor of these vessels is 
their slow transit speed and need for heavy-lift to get them to the theater requiring their 
capabilities (Frank et al. 2014). 
The CH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter is utilized for mine hunting, minesweeping, 
and mine neutralization missions. This helicopter is deployed from a big-deck ship such 
as an LHD, but theoretically could operate from shore or other big-deck ship if necessary. 
The Sea Dragon has less vulnerability to mines as it is an air asset, but it could still be 
damaged by mines when detonated beneath the helicopter. The CH-53E is limited by its 
flight time of approximately four hours, and its need to return to base to switch out 
between hunting systems, sweeping systems, and neutralization systems.   
b. Future 
The LCS MCM Mission Package consists of the RMS for search and 
classification, and an SH-60 helicopter for identification and neutralization. The LCS is 
not intended to operate within the minefield and depends on the RMS to enter and search 
the minefield. The RMS is launched and recovered from the LCS in order to conduct its 
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search operations. The SH-60 is also launched and recovered from the LCS (Frank et al. 
2014, National Research Council, Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 2001).   
3. MK18 MOD 2 
According to the Avenger class platform MCM Embark officer Mark Sergi and 
MK18 Mod 2 project team member Michael Stuckenschnieder, the MK18 Mod 2 is a 
surfaced launched search, classification, and identification asset (Mark Sergi, personal 
comm., Michael Stuckenschnieder, personal comm.). It is operated by explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams in the 5th fleet AOR to assist in mine-clearance 
operations. The MK18 can be launched from small craft utilizing purpose-built carrying 
cradles. The 11-meter RHIB is one asset utilized for the launch and recovery of the 
MK18 Mod 2. 
4. Overlap 
The MCM-1 Avenger vessels and the CH-53s are scheduled to be replaced by the 
LCS MCM mission package by the year 2024 as shown in Figure 14.  This figure still 
presents the intention that the LCS replaces all other MCM platforms in an unknown 
future end state. 
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Figure 14.  LCS/MCM Overlap (source: Amador 2011) 
The MK18 Mod 2 is not part of the intended LCS MCM Mission Package, but the 
MK18 is a proven asset already operational with EOD units in 5th Fleet. The LCS MCM 
MP RMS has run into significant problems during its development and testing, and has 
been recommended for review by the Senate Armed Services Committee in comparison 
with other MCM search assets (Rear Admiral Rick Williams, USN (Ret), personal 
comm.). Even before this recommendation, SMEs and fleet representatives were 
concerned with the RMS performance and had suggested modeling the MK18 Mod 2 in 
place of the LCS MCM MP RMS. 
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 
1. Legacy 
The legacy operational concept modeled by the MIW 2014 team involved parallel 
search and hunt by legacy surface and aviation assets (Frank et al. 2014). As this method 
of hunt returned the highest ACRS in that study, this is the only legacy configuration that 
was used for comparison in the MIW 2015 study. This concept relied on a known 
minefield, split between surface and airborne assets. In this concept, a single MCM-1 
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Avenger vessel conducts a ladder search in its assigned area, while the CH-53E 
simultaneously conducts a search of its assigned area. As the MCM-1 vessel detects 
MILCOs, it conducts immediate identification and neutralization. The CH-53Es require 
PMA to determine target location and generate a target list. Once a target list is 
generated, then the CH-53 can be outfitted with a neutralization system in order to 
prosecute the MILCO. 
2. Future
In the “as modeled” LCS MCM Mission Package, the LCS launches the RMS in 
order to search the minefield. At the completion of each RMS sortie, the data is 
downloaded and PMA is conducted. Any MILCOs located are added to a target list. Once 
a target list is available, the MH-60S is launched to identify and neutralize up to four 
contacts on the target list at a time, dependent on the MH-60’s sortie time.   
3. MK18 MOD 2
The LCS utilizing the MK18 Mod 2 concept of operations is very similar to the 
planned LCS MCM MP RMS. However, the MK18 Mod 2 has a significantly slower 
transit speed and is normally taken to its operating areas by RHIB when used by EOD 
teams. In the LCS MK18 model, the transit from the LCS to the minefield is conducted 
by RHIB launched from the LCS. The RHIB transits and then launches the MK18 at the 
edge of the minefield. The MK18 then executes a search pattern, and based on its battery 
life will end its search at the same end of the minefield that it was launched on. Then the 
RHIB picks up the MK18 and transits back to the LCS. Upon recovery aboard the LCS, 
the data is downloaded and the MK18 is readied for another sortie. PMA generates a 
target list that is then prosecuted by the MH-60 in the same fashion as for the standard 
LCS MCM MP. This concept is consistent for multiple MK18s.   
C. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
The operational scenario utilized in this study is the same as utilized by MIW 
Team 2014. This was done to allow comparisons between that team’s findings and data 
with MIW Team 2015’s findings. Their scenario assumed a deep water (>200 ft.) SLOC 
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scenario in a 10x10 grid (100 NM2).  100 mines and 400 non-mine contacts were seeded 
throughout the area. This scenario is representative of many maritime chokepoints such 
as the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, shown in Figure 15. The mine density was 
recommended by experts as a realistic representation of mine and non-mine density. At 
simulation start, the search assets conduct a ladder search as discussed in their respective 
concepts. The scenario completes when the complete grid is searched and all targets on 
the target list have been prosecuted.   
Three basic variants MCM variants were compared. Team MIW 2014’s legacy 
configuration 2A was taken for the legacy comparison. This was the legacy configuration 
tested that had the highest ACRS for that group, and consisted of an MCM 1 Avenger-
class vessel hunting in parallel with a CH-53E. The LCS variant modeled by Team MIW 
2014 utilized the LCS MCM MP Inc 1 configuration as described in Table 4.  There is 
one exception as Team MIW 2014 did not model the shallow water mining capability of 
the ALMDS as the scenario only utilized deep water mines.  
Figure 15.  Operational Scenario MIW 2014 and 2015 
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Table 4.   MCM Mission Package Increments (adapted from Frank et al. 
2014) 







Airborne Laser Mine 
Detection System – SH-60S 
surface mine detection system 
X    
Detect, classify, and 
localize near surface 
mines 
Airborne Mine Neutralization 
System – SH-60S carried mine 
neutralization system X  X*  
Identify and 
neutralize bottom and 
moored mines in 
shallow water. 
*add near surface 
mines 
AN/AQS-20A – RMS carried 
mine detection sonar X    
Detect, localize, 
classify of bottom 
mines in deep water 
Remote Mine hunting System 
– Large Multi-Mission UUV 
transported and launched from 
the LCS 
X    
Remote vehicle that 
tows AN/AQS-20A  
Coastal Battlefield 
Reconnaissance and Analysis 
System – UAV for beachhead 
minefield detection 
 X   
Provide intelligence 
preparation for the 
minefield 
Unmanned Influence Sweep 
System – Unmanned surface 
vessel towing influence 
sweeping systems 
  X  
Unmanned surface 
vehicle that tows an 
influence sweep 
 
Finally, 11 separate MK18 Mod 2 configurations were modeled, corresponding to 
different numbers of MK18s utilized to perform the search function.  Table 5 graphically 
depicts the different configurations utilized in this study. The modeled performance data 
for configurations 2A and 3 were taken directly from Team MIW 2014’s report for 
comparison to Team MIW 2015’s modeled MK18 data. The only difference between the 




Table 5.   MCM Configurations 
 
Configuration Platform Helicopter Subsystems 
2A Legacy MCM 1 MH-53-E 
MCM 1: AN/SQQ-32, SLQ-48 MH-53E: 
AN/AQS-24             Hunt Method: Serial 
3 LCS MH-60s LCS: RMS with AN/AQS-20, MH-60s: 
Archerfish            Hunt Method: Serial 
1M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            
Hunt Method: Serial 
2M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            Hunt Method: Serial 
3M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            
Hunt Method: Serial 
4M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            Hunt Method: Serial 
5M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            
Hunt Method: Serial 
6M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            Hunt Method: Serial 
7M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            
Hunt Method: Serial 
8M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            Hunt Method: Serial 
9M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            
Hunt Method: Serial 
10M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            Hunt Method: Serial 
12M MK18  MH-60s LCS: MK18 Mod 2,  MH-60s: Archerfish            
Hunt Method: Serial 
 
D. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND SCENARIO SUMMARY 
The legacy, LCS and MK18 Mod 2 concepts of operations were discussed and 
described as modeled for this project. The relationship of the Team MIW 2014 capstone 
project with this project was discussed, as was the decision to keep the data from both 
studies comparable by utilizing the same operational scenario. Finally, all configurations 
utilized were defined for easy reference. 
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V. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE 
MCM system architectures based on the legacy Avenger class MCM 1, the 
current LCS MCM Inc 1, and the alternative MK18 Mod 2 system are detailed in this 
chapter. This chapter also contains the functional and physical hierarchies for the MCM 
system. For this capstone project, physical developments of a new system were not 
analyzed.   Modeling and simulation utilizing ExtendSim was conducted to represent the 
actual systems for the analysis. Understanding the system architecture was required for 
traceability of the component functional and physical architectures to their specific 
system functions as described in the systems engineering process chapter. The main goal 
was to gain an understanding of the MIW systems from a SE perspective rather than 
developing a new MIW proof of concept model that would be used for MCM analysis.  
A. FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
According to Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), “functional analysis is an iterative 
process of translating system requirements into detailed design criteria. The purpose is to 
develop the top level system architecture and present an overall integrated description of 
the systems functional architecture” (86). The functions that are performed in MCM 
operations aid in the definition of the architecture. Decomposing these functions resulted 
in the functional architecture for the MIW project. The functional architecture is 
described in this chapter. 
1. Top Level Functional Hierarchy 
This study will focus on the mine hunting operations in deep water (water depths 
greater than 200 feet). The top level functional hierarchy for MIW is illustrated in Figure 
16.  The primary functions associated with mine hunting are highlighted in green and the 
functions highlighted in grey are functions that are not part of this study. The functions 
highlighted in orange and blue are necessary in order to capture and analyze the ACRS 
for the operation. They include the control equipment functions and the analyze function 
data respectively. Finally, the maintain equipment function contains the ACRS and the 
conduct of the mission affected by operational availability (Ao). 
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Figure 16.  MIW Function Hierarchy (source: PEO LMW 2009) 
2. Mine Hunting Functional Hierarchy 
Figure 17 depicts the functional hierarchy view of the MCM model. For this 
study, perform minesweeping, disarm mine, and analyze mine are not included. The 

































Figure 17.  Mine Hunting Functional Hierarchy (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
a. Detect Mine 
The first phase in performing mine hunting is to detect and look for what are 
perceived as mines by sending out pings. This is typically performed by sensing. Using 
sensors, the systems detect these pings from mines, the seafloor, and other objects 
floating in the waters. At the completion of the detection, the system reports if there are 
mines and/or possible mines within the vicinity that was scanned. If no possible mines 
are detected, the system continues onto the next scan area and the results are 
communicated to the personnel and other ships in the area. Objects that are detected as a 
mine-like echo (MILEC) proceed to the next sequence for classification. 
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b. Classify Mine 
After an object is distinguished as a MILEC, they must be classified as either a 
MILCO or a non-MILCO. This function is executed to distinguish which MILECs have a 
high probability of being an actual mine. This information is used to further investigate 
those objects and determine which are mines and which are not mines. 
c. Reacquire MILCO 
This function is performed when a different system is used in the identification 
phase. Reacquiring MILCO involves the tasks to search for and find the signal sources so 
they can be investigated and identified as mines or non-mines. 
d. Identify Mine 
The identification phase analyzes the MILCO objects and determines if they are 
mines or non-mines. The type and location of the mines are then communicated to the 
appropriate personnel, supporting platform, and the other ships in the area. The results are 
then fed into the neutralization phase which marks the area as a minefield to warn 
unsuspecting vessels. 
e. Neutralize Mine 
The neutralize mine function eliminates the function of mine so they cannot 
explode and cause unwanted damage. This is done by either detonating the mines or by 
disarming them. For this study, the focus is on destroying the mines. 
f. Reacquire Mine 
Similar to the Reacquire MILCO function, this reacquisition function is 
performed when a different system is used for neutralization. Again, this function 
involves the tasks to search for and find the mine signal sources so that they can be 
neutralized. 
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g. Destroy Mine 
The mine destruction function involves finding the mine-like objects and 
destroying the ones that are perceived as mines so that, when detonated, explosions do 
not cause damage or harm. For this study, an airborne asset was used to destroy the 
mines. 
3. MIW Operational Flow Diagram 
Figure 18 depicts the top level functional flow block diagram of the MK18 Mod 2 







































Figure 18.  MK18 Mod 2 Operational Flow Diagram 
a. Begin Mission 
This is the first stage in a mine hunting mission. Orders are received to begin a new 
mission utilizing the MK18 Mod 2 UUV. 
b. LCS Transit to Staging Area 
At this state, the LCS equipped with a RHIB and MK18 Mod 2 transits to the safe zone 
mine hunting staging area. 
c. Launch RHIB 
A RHIB hosts one or more MK18 Mod 2’s and is located on an LCS platform. 
This function is the launching of the RHIB into the water. 
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d. Transit to Start Point 
The RHIB that was just launched transits to the starting point where the MK18 
Mod 2 is set for release. This is a predetermined spot at the location of the targeted search 
area. 
e. Launch MK18 
The MK18 Mod 2 is released from the RHIB into the water at the predetermined 
spot of the minefield search area. From here, the MK18 Mod 2 is ready to start its mine 
hunting mission. 
f. MK18 Begins Search 
The MK18 Mod 2 begins to scan and sense the uncharted minefield area for mine-
like objects. Any findings are recorded to the onboard memory.  
g. MK18 Ends Search 
At the completion of the scan area, the MK18 Mod 2 finishes all of its passes 
along a dedicated path and is awaiting recovery from a RHIB. The MK18 Mod 2 plans its 
search to end on the same side it was released regardless of finishing its search before all 
of its energy is utilized. All data collected is stored in local memory ready to be analyzed. 
h. RHIB Recovers MK18 
This function describes the RHIB as it retrieves the MK18 Mod 2 from the open 
water. It is loaded onto the RHIB awaiting transport to the LCS platform. 
i. RHIB Transits to LCS 
As the RHIB equipped with the MK18 Mod 2 transits away from the search area, 
it makes its way to the LCS where it will be stowed. 
j. RHIB Recovered aboard LCS 
This function describes the recovery of the RHIB as it makes its way to the LCS 
for stowage and extraction of MK18 Mod 2 data collection. 
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k. Post Mission Analysis 
This is where the data captured from the search area via the MK18 Mod 2 is 
extracted and analyzed for mine and non-mine objects. This is where threat and/or non-
threat classifications are made. 
l. Create Target List 
Upon completion of the PMA, a list of generated mine threats are compiled. From 
here, the listing is disseminated to the personnel and platforms that will be engaging in or 
near the conducted search area. 
m. Launch Neutralization Mission 
After receiving the mine target list, a MH-60S is tasked to neutralize the mines. 
n. Neutralize Mines 
At this state, the MH-60S that was deployed searches for and neutralizes the 
objects that were classified as mines during the initial hunt by the MK18 Mod 2. 
B. PHYSICAL HIERARCHY 
This report focuses on the comparison of the legacy MCM MP – MCM 1 the 
current LCS MCM Inc 1, and the future MCM MP – MK18 Mod 2. The MCM functions 
described above are performed by several systems.  Figure 19 shows the first three levels 
of MCM Systems with the legacy MCM 1, the LCS MCM Inc 1 that relies on the LCS 
remote multi-mission vehicle (RMMV) configured as the RMS to perform mine hunting, 
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Figure 19.  MCM System Physical Hierarchy 
1. MCM 1 
“The Avenger class MCM 1 ships were designed as mine hunter-killers capable of 
finding, classifying and destroying moored and bottom mines” (Global Security 2011, 1). 
Their main goal was to detect, classify, and neutralize all objects classified as mines and 
mine-like objects with the primary mission objectives of mine hunting, mine 
neutralization, and mine sweeping.  “The MCM 1 navigates and clears minefields by first 
sweeping the search areas and also conducts coordinated operations with airborne and 
other mine countermeasure forces” (Global Security 2011, 1). 
2. LCS MCM Inc 1 
LCS is “intended to accommodate a variety of individual warfare systems 
assembled and integrated into four interchangeable mission packages” (Spilman 2013, 1). 
For this study, the LCS MCM Inc 1 was analyzed.   
The Inc 1 mission package includes “the RMS which consists of the RMMV and 
the AN/AQS-20A sonar system” (Global Security 2014, 235). It also incorporates “the 
MH-60S Block 2A/B Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) System which consists 
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of an AMCM system operator workstation, a tether system, and the two MCM systems 
currently under development – ALMDS for detection and classification of near surface 
mines, and the AMNS for identification and neutralization of bottom mines” (Global 
Security 2014, 239). 
3. MK18 Mod 2 
The MK18 Mod 2 is an autonomous UUV that is in operation and “used by the 
U.S. Navy for mine detection missions with an improved endurance and area coverage 
rate that replaces the in-theater Swordfish system” (Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Panama City Division Public Affairs 2013, 1). The MK18 Mod 2 is normally taken to its 
operating areas by RHIB when used by EOD teams. The RHIB transits and then launches 
the MK18 Mod 2 at the edge of the minefield.  “The UUV is pre-programmed and 
designed to scan waters for targets or threats” (Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama 
City Division Public Affairs 2013, 1). The UUV then executes a search pattern, and 
based on its battery life will end its search at the same end of the minefield that it was 
launched on. Afterwards, the RHIB picks up the MK18 Mod 2 and transits back to the 
LCS. Upon recovery aboard the LCS, the data is downloaded and the MK18 Mod 2 is 
readied for another sortie. Finally, PMA generates a target list that is then prosecuted by 
the MH-60. 
C. SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the functional and physical hierarchies of MIW. 
Diagrams were developed to represent the functions of interest for mine warfare 
operations within the predefined 10x10 grid (100 NM2) scenario. The functional 
hierarchy was further decomposed to an overall MIW diagram, the mine hunting 
functional hierarchy, and the operational flow of the MK18 Mod 2. The decomposed 
diagrams aided in the development of the simulation model and were modified 
accordingly in order to satisfy stakeholder requirements. 
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VI. MODELING AND SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter discusses the modeling and simulation (M&S) approach applied as a 
result from following the tailored SE process described earlier to select the method to 
generate the necessary data for analysis. The chapter details the processes implemented 
during the initial evaluation of the provided model, subsequent analysis of alternatives 
and eventual down select to a modeling approach. Modeling and simulation with known 
data points was performed to ensure that a successfully modified model, codenamed 
ARMS, existed and functioned to provide valuable information to the stakeholder 
community. 
A. MODEL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
Using a tailored SE process, the team focused the study on the evaluation of 
legacy, current and the potential alternative of inclusion of the MK18 Mod 2 within a 
standardized MIW reference mission. Through modeling and simulation the MOE and 
MOP, as determined through stakeholder analysis, were measured to derive the overall 
effectiveness within the reference mission providing decision makers insight for further 
research or planning. As this capstone project was performing follow-on work to the 
2014 MIW effort, the prior team’s ExtendSim models were provided by the NPS staff for 
baseline use and extension in this study. The ExtendSim modeling and simulation tool 
implements a graphical programming environment, supplemented by additional user 
developed code, in which the model developer can implement configurable items in 
structured connections to replicate the desired activity under study. The models provided 
were constructed in a modular fashion, separating the mission into high level functional 
blocks of search, PMA and neutralization. With each high level block decomposing into 
lower level functions required to replicate the mission scenarios accurately. While the 
two provided models were similar in replicating the mission plan, they differed slightly in 
their makeup as the legacy includes the capability of the seaborne assets to perform both 
the hunt and neutralization aspects of the mission. The model was kept intact as part of 
this study to provide comparative baseline information. 
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B. FEASIBILITY 
To begin the analysis of modeling capabilities, the MCM MP Inc 1 model was 
examined to determine break points and modules for code reuse or adaption. Further 
reverse engineering was performed, in which differing modification strategies were 
applied for consideration with intermediate results analyzed during regular meetings 
among the MIW 2015 team. The primary portions of the existing 2014 model requiring 
modification for extended study were the search and PMA portions of the modeled 
mission. One method considered involved duplicating the search function of the single 
asset, modified with additional transit time for a single RHIB to place MK18 Mod 2 at 
the appropriate starting locations within the search grid. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
To satisfy the stated desires of the stakeholder community, simulations to 
determine the approximate number of MK18 Mod 2 devices that would equate to the 
search effectiveness of the legacy and LCS MP1 were created from the ExtendSim LCS 
MP1 model. A separate cost analysis was performed using the significant variables to 
arrive at the appropriate cost estimation figures of all multiples of MK18 Mod 2 
employed. The methodology, results and conclusions are included in Chapter IX. To 
achieve the goal, a strategy to modify the single hunt search area to extrapolate the use of 
multiple MK18 Mod 2s performing the search functions was presented to the advisors 
after receiving concurrence on the approach during the 3 August 2015 meeting with 
NMAWC MIW requirements N8 Richard Kimmel. In this approach, the number of 
search targets, both mines and non-mines, were kept constant and the search grid width 
modified as required for the number of MK18 Mod 2 for data gathering and analysis. 
Using the performance parameter variations obtained during stakeholder analysis and 
feedback from the SME, model runs were performed in accordance with the requirements 
of the nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) stated in Chapter VII. 
D. MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
After determining the model and strategy to be implemented, the various 
configurations were subjected to verification and validation processes to ensure the data 
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produced during the “run for record” would produce valid information. Following the 
intent of Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction (DODI) 5000.61, “DOD Modeling 
and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&A)” (Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) 2009) the 
verification of the model ensured produced data “accurately represent the developer’s 
conceptual description and specification” (DODI 5000.61, 2009). In similar fashion 
validation of the model was performed and the resultant data to ensure that both were “an 
accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the 
model” (DODI 5000.61, 2009). 
1. Verification 
During the verification process of a project the determination of whether the 
requirements were met is performed. The verification of requirements can be adjudicated 
through various methods; analysis, testing, inspection or demonstration via either a 
physical or simulated event. As the majority of the requirements for this project were of 
allowable ranges of performance, the numerical outputs produced by the corresponding 
input values was verified as accurate through the inspection of the code.  
2. Validation 
The validation process of a system measures how well it matches to the 
stakeholder’s expressed need. In this project, since the input parameters were all of 
sanitized unclassified data, the ranges provided were representative producing only 
generalized results. Since the stakeholder’s stated need was for a tool to perform a 
comparison between multiple alternatives, each using similar sanitized parameters, there 
was not a need for results that would be similar to actual system performance because 
that would potentially produce classified results. Within the model, the MOE determined 
to be most significant to the operational mission were that of ACRS and percent 
clearance. Results of model runs were provided to SMEs for feedback on the 
reasonableness of the results. As such the model produced representative data that 
satisfied the stakeholder’s expectations, and was considered as being sufficiently valid. 
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E. MODELING AND SIMULATION CONCLUSION 
Development, testing and implementation of a modeling and simulation approach 
were achieved through multiple iterations leveraging a DOE approach. Although the 
DOE portion of this project is detail expressly in Chapter VII, it was used extensively in 
the analyses of all model iterations to ensure that proper data could be produced and 
replicated prior to commitment to the selected approach. While there remain questions to 
explore regarding the implementation of multiple neutralization assets, the model and 
strategy implemented does provide the requisite data points to produce a comparison 
between legacy, current, and future alternative MIW assets. 
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VII. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
A design of experiments was conducted prior to entering the modeling and 
simulation phase of the project. This was accomplished to ensure that a sufficient number 
of model runs were conducted to minimize potential undesired correlation between input 
variables and to maintain statistical significance. The resulting data could then be used to 
determine which variable input factors were of most influence to ACRS and percent 
clearance. 
A. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
A subset of existing model variable input factors were looked at both from a 
perspective of factors that were previously investigated as well as those that applied to 
configurations relevant to utilizing the MK18 Mod 2 as the hunt/classification asset.  
Table 6 shows the variable input factors that were investigated. A total of 38 surface hunt 
and air parameters were considered in the model, but only 20 of those were variable 
factors. Each factor listed below is shown with its corresponding input value range (min 
and max). The air asset factors were kept the same as those values used in the previous 
project since it was not the purpose of this project to investigate air asset factors. Varying 
these factors may also have had a negative impact to those surface factors that were the 
subject of interest.  
Table 6.   Variable Input Factor Description and Ranges 
Input Factor Factor Description 
LCS config 3 LCS with MK18 
Min Max Min Max 
S_SearchSpeed_kt Surface search speed 5 10 3 5 
S_TurnTime_s Surface turn time at end of track 300 600 160 200 
S_TransitSpd_kt 
Surface transit 
speed from staging 
area to minefield 20 50 20 40 
S_NumHntTrk_pNM Surface hunt tracks per nautical mile 20 20 26 34 
S_SStreamT_hr 
Surface time to 
stream search 
equipment 0.25 2 0.508 1.5 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 6 (continued from previous page) 
 
Input Factor Factor Description 
LCS config 3 LCS with MK18 
Min Max Min Max 
S_SRecoverT_hr 
Surface time to 
recover search 
equipment 0.25 2 0.003 0.34 
S_Replenish_hr Surface replenish time 2 4 1.5 15 
S_SortieTime_hr Surface max sortie time 10 20 15 20 
S_Pd 
Surface probability 
of detecting a 
MILEC 0.70 0.90 0.60 0.85 
S_Pcmm 
Surface probability 
of classifying a 
MILEC as a 
MILCO 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.9 
S_Pcnn 
Surface probability 
of classifying a non-
MILEC as a 
MILCO 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.9 
A_TransitSpd_kt 
Airborne transit 
speed from staging 
area to minefield 80 150 80 150 
A_ReplenishT_hr 
Airborne time to 
replenish 
neutralizers 1 2 1 2 
A_Prmm 
Airborne probability 
of reacquiring a 
MILCO as a 
MILCO 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.80 
A_Prnn 
Airborne probability 
of reacquiring a 
MILCO as a non-
MILCO 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.30 
A_Pimm 
Airborne probability 
of identifying a 
MILCO as a mine 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 
A_Pn 
Airborne probability 
of neutralizing a 
mine 0.70 0.90 0.70 0.90 
A_RDeployT_hr 
Airborne time to 
deploy reacquisition 
and identification 
equipment 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 
A_RRecoverT_hr 




equipment 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 
A_NeutSpeed_kt Airborne neutralizer speed 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 
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Some key differences between surface model input factors were the result of the 
different hunt asset used (MK18 vs. RMS). Most notably the surface search speed for the 
MK18 Mod 2 is much slower than that of the RMS despite having a faster turn time. 
Another significant element accounting for the varying ranges in surface hunt factors can 
be attributed to the requirement to keep all data used throughout the investigation 
unclassified. This required the need for data ranges that both included and masked the 
true values. In addition, the probability of detection (S_Pd), the surface probability of 
classifying a MILEC as a MILCO (S_Pcmm), and the surface probability of classifying a 
non-MILEC as a MILCO (S_Pcnn) ranges used were greater than that used by the 
previous project team. These changes were directly involved in differences seen in mine 
detection. The remaining 18 factors used within the simulation were held at constant 
values, either zero or some other constant value.  
 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
Once the factors of interest were identified the necessary model input data 
required proper formatting to run model simulations. NOLH design spreadsheets 
(Sanchez 2011) were used to generate the required data. The NOLH spreadsheets take 
variable ranges as input by the user and generates data for simulations, dependent on the 
number of factors. For the 20 factors of interest it was determined, as a result of using the 
NOLH spreadsheet, that 129 runs would be required to minimize potential unwanted 
correlations between input variables. “It takes extensive time to generate these designs 
using our algorithm; therefore, a catalogue of ready-to-use, nearly orthogonal and good 
space-filling designs for up to 22 factors in as few as 129 runs has been given by Cioppa 
(2002) and available for download at http://harvest.nps.edu (Cioppa and Lucas 2007, 45). 
Because the t-distribution begins to approach the normal distribution at around 30 
degrees of freedom, it was determined that 3,870 runs (129 runs x 30 replications) would 
be required for each configuration under investigation. While preventing unwanted 
correlation between input factors, the NOLH spreadsheet also ensured that the variation 
between variable input factors was evenly distributed. JMP™ statistical software was 
used to perform data analysis of the resulting 46,440 total model runs performed across 
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all MK18 configurations under investigation. Table 7 displays results from this analysis 
to include the mean ACRS and percent clearance for each configuration as well as the 
lower and upper 95% confidence interval.  
Table 7.   Mean and 95% Confidence Interval for ACRS and % Clearance 
  






Configuration Lower Upper Lower Upper 
2A 5.35 5.25 5.45 0.33 0.32 0.34 
3 4.80 4.71 4.89 0.33 0.32 0.34 
1M 1.80 1.79 1.81 0.26 0.26 0.26 
2M 3.51 3.48 3.54 0.26 0.26 0.26 
3M 5.00 4.96 5.03 0.26 0.26 0.26 
4M 6.05 6.01 6.09 0.26 0.26 0.26 
5M 6.72 6.67 6.76 0.26 0.26 0.26 
6M 7.18 7.13 7.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 
7M 7.40 7.35 7.46 0.26 0.26 0.26 
8M 7.59 7.53 7.65 0.26 0.26 0.26 
9M 7.71 7.64 7.77 0.26 0.25 0.26 
10M 7.80 7.73 7.86 0.26 0.26 0.26 
12M 7.95 8.01 8.01 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 
 
ACRS is calculated by  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇Total
                    
 Area = Total area covered by hunt asset 
 TTotal = Total mission time divided by 24 hours 
While percent clearance is calculated by % 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  
The data resulting from the multiple model runs was analyzed using JMP™ 
statistical software. The mean of both ACRS and percent clearance is presented in Figure 
20 and Figure 21.  These figures plot the ACRS and percent clearance for each MCM 
configuration.  The MK18 Mod 2 configurations simply vary the number of MK18s 
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simulated, and these are listed as 1M-10M, 12M.  Configuration 2a and 3 are carried over 
from team MIW 2014 and are representative of the legacy MCM 1 Avenger and CH-53E 
hunting in parallel, and the LCS MCM MP increment 1, respectively. 
Legacy configuration 2a was seen to have an ACRS of 5.34 with a percent 
clearance of 32%. LCS configuration 3 had an ACRS of 4.8 with a percent clearance of 
33%. From the ACRS plot in Figure 20, it can be seen that an LCS configuration 4M 
using 4 MK18s exceeds the ACRS performance of both the legacy 2a and LCS 
configuration 3 by 0.70 and 1.25 respectively. 
Percent clearance was seen to drop below that of legacy configuration 2a and LCS 
configuration 3 values by approximately 6.5%. This can be attributed to the lower ranges 
in classification and the difference in ranges used for surface probability of detection for 
the previous project (0.70 to 0.90) and those used for this project and the MK18 (0.60 to 
0.85), as well as the lower probability of classifying a mine as a mine given for the MK18 
(0.50 to 0.90 as compared to 0.70 to 0.90 for the RMS). With a lower range, it was 
expected and verified by simulation results that a lower percent clearance would be seen. 
When surface probability of detection increases, more mines are detected 
resulting in a reduction in ACRS. Configurations of 1 through 10 MK18s were the 
primary focus areas of this study but after plotting the results in the initial plots of Figure 
20 for up to 10 MK18s, it was noted that as additional MK18s were added to the 
simulation the plot began to asymptotically approach an ACRS of somewhere around 8. 
The 12 MK18 run was an excursion to see what was occurring past 10 MK18s and if the 
plot still asymptotically approached a value close to 8 as expected. As seen in Figure 20, 
the 12 MK18 Mod 2 configurations seem to go against the theory that additional MK18s 
beyond 10 will asymptotically approach an ACRS of around 8. The graph appears to be 
approaching another ACRS value, but the increase is still not as dramatic as lower MK18 




Figure 20.  Mean of ACRS vs. Configuration 
 
 


























The top three significant factors for each MK18 configuration are shown in Table 
8.  They consisted of surface replenish time (S_Replenish_hr), surface search speed 
(S_SearchSpeed_kt), number of search hunt tracks per nautical mile 
(S_NumHntTrk_pNM), probability of classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO (S_Pcnn), 
and surface probability of detecting a MILEC (S_Pd). Airborne time to recover 
reacquisition and identification equipment (A_RRecoverT_hr) was omitted from the 
variables of interest primarily because air factors were not the focus of this study.  It also 
never ranked higher than third as a predictor. This analysis was accomplished by running 
a fit model in JMP™ with all 38 factors as model effects with ACRS and percent 
clearance. A stepwise regression allowed for a subset of effects to be chosen for the 
regression model. This also improved the model’s prediction capabilities by reducing 
variance caused by estimating unnecessary terms. Table 9  shows the absolute value of 
the t-ratio for each factor of interest. The t-ratio tests if the true value of the parameter in 
question is zero. The t-ratio itself is the standard error. This study’s primary focus was to 
compare the hunt effectiveness of various configurations consisting of anywhere from 1 
to 10 MK18s to that of the RMS’ hunt effectiveness.  
Table 8.   ACRS Top Three Significant Factors 
Configuration 1 2 3 
1M S_Replenish_hr S_SearchSpeed_kt S_NumHntTrk_pNM 
2M S_Replenish_hr S_SearchSpeed_kt S_NumHntTrk_pNM 
3M S_Replenish_hr S_SearchSpeed_kt S_NumHntTrk_pNM 
4M S_Replenish_hr S_Pcnn S_SearchSpeed_kt 
5M S_Pcnn S_Replenish_hr S_SearchSpeed_kt 
6M S_Pcnn S_Pd S_Replenish_hr 
7M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 
8M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 
9M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 
10M S_Pcnn S_Pd A_RRecoverT_hr 




Table 9.   ACRS Absolute Value of t ratio for Significant Factors 
Configuration 
(# MK18) 
ACRS S_Replenish_hr S_SearchSpeed_kt S_Pcnn S_Pd 
Mean │t ratio│ 
1 1.800 185.40 160.90     
2 3.510 169.40 152.35     
3 5.000 100.40 91.42     
4 6.050 66.65 56.65 57.08   
5 6.720 47.92 32.44 82.78   
6 7.180 33.27   102.16 39.37 
7 7.400     116.14 44.92 
8 7.590     116.26 46.39 
9 7.710     111.57 43.14 
10 7.800     104.49 42.25 
12 7.950     96.87 37.44 
 
The top three significant factors for percent clearance are presented in Table 10.  
Surface probability of classifying a MILEC as a MILCO (S_Pcmm) dominates the top 
position with airborne probability of identifying a MILCO as a mine (A_Pimm) and 
Surface Probability of detecting a MILEC (S_Pd). Again, since the air asset was not the 
primary focus of this project S_Pd was chosen as a factor of interest over A_Pimm 
although both factors had t ratios that were very close together. 









Clearance S_Pcmm S_Pd 
Mean │t ratio│ 
1M 0.258 62.87 36.22 
2M 0.260 61.82 37.28 
3M 0.257 61.74 39.20 
4M 0.257 60.50 36.05 
5M 0.260 60.92 36.58 
6M 0.258 61.80 37.08 
7M 0.258 60.59 35.21 
8M 0.257 60.42 36.70 
9M 0.256 61.32 37.00 
10M 0.260 61.97 36.01 
12M 0.258 59.83 35.60 
 
Figure 22 plots percent clearance and ACRS against legacy configuration 2a, LCS 
configuration 3, and all MK18 configurations. As seen in previous graphs ACRS 
performance increases as MK18 numbers increase with configuration 4M and above 
showing a greater ACRS than both legacy and LCS configurations. As mentioned earlier 
percent clearance remains fairly constant over all MK18 configurations, but is still lower 




Figure 22.  Configuration Performance 
From a purely ACRS standpoint four MK18s exceed the performance of both 
legacy configuration 2a and LCS configuration 3. There does appear to be a point of 
diminishing returns where ACRS performance gains are not as drastic. The jump from 
9M to 10M is not as great as the increase from 1M to 2M.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Using the 38 factors that the previous MIW team (2104) looked at and based the 
model off of it was determined that 20 of those factors were variable. The remaining 
factors were held constant. Surface search factors were given as ranges to maintain the 
unclassified nature of this report. Air neutralization factors were kept the same as 
previously used since the primary focus of this project is surface search parameters and 
surface hunt effectiveness of the MK18 Mod 2 versus that of the previously studied 
RMS. Using the appropriate NOLH spreadsheet for the amount of variable input factors 
(20) the amount of required model runs, including replication, was determined. Eleven 
MK18 Mod 2 configurations were investigated, one through 10 and 12 MK18s. The 
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resulting data was analyzed using JMP™ statistical software and mean ACRS and 
percent clearance numbers were calculated. Using this data plots were constructed to 
relate the eleven MK18 Mod 2 configurations with the ACRS and percent clearance 
values from legacy 2a and LCS configuration 3 determined in the previous MIW project 
(2014). Also using JMP™ statistical software the top three significant model input 
factors were determined. This comprised both surface search and air neutralization 
factors. The top significant input factors for ACRS were found to be surface replenish 
time (S_Replenish_hr), surface search speed (S_SearchSpeed_kt), surface probability of 
classifying a non-mine as a non-MILCO (S_Pcnn), and the surface probability of 
detection (S_Pd). The top significant factors for percent clearance, not including air 
neutralization factors were surface probability of classifying a mine as a MILCO and 
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VIII. COST AND RISK ANALYSIS 
Included within this study are the comparisons of legacy and future MIW 
systems, as well as the potential use of the MK18 Mod 2, through an evaluation of cost 
and risk associated with the systems. An evaluation which relies solely upon performance 
data alone is not sufficient to provide an accurate reflection of overall effectiveness 
without the factoring of the costs and operational risk associated with the system. An 
effective system is one that performs within the expected parameters with minimal risk 
and at reasonable costs to the acquirer. Providing the acquirer the requisite information 
regarding cost, performance and risk allows decision makers the ability to accurately 
evaluate comparative systems for selection based upon a value based analysis. This 
chapter describes the cost and risk analyses performed by the 2015 MIW team to 
determine the best value recommendation. 
A. COST ANALYSIS 
The cost analysis performed by the team was scoped to evaluate only operating 
and sustainment (O&S) costs. Other life-cycle costs were excluded from study in order to 
keep this follow on study in line with the previous efforts, and the time and manpower 
constraints shared with the previous 2014 MIW capstone team. 
Within the DOD, acquisitions processes are detailed in DOD Directive (DODD) 
5000 series of policy documents, and implemented through the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (DAG) as an authoritative source for the acquisition community for policies 
and procedures. The guidebook describes the four major categories of programmatic life-
cycle costs (Defense Acquistion University 2014) as follows: 
• Research and Development – Costs associated with trade studies, technology 
development, design, fabrication, integration and testing 
• Investment – Costs associated with the production and deployment of a 
capability 
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• O&S – Costs associated with the operation, maintenance and support of a 
fielded system including mission costs - those costs and expenditures to 
support a baseline system or task unit on an hourly cost basis 
• Disposal – Costs associated with the demilitarization disposal of military 
assets 
1. Cost Analysis Methodology 
The O&S costs referenced within this study for legacy assets were obtained from 
the 2014 MIW capstone team’s report in order for the data to remain consistent. The 
original source of the cost information for the legacy systems evaluated was the Navy 
Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) management 
information system. The VAMOSC system, available to U.S. government personnel, 
collects and provides reporting of historical O&S costs data for the Navy and Marine 
Corps weapon systems. Available cost information was supplemented with current inputs 
for the MK18 Mod 2 obtained by the 2015 MIW team through SME feedback and 
research, with a focus on being consistent with the study’s objective of evaluating the 
hunt effectiveness of the MK18 Mod 2 alternative solution. Cost data included in this 
study relies on estimating the O&S costs associated with supporting the MIW mission. In 
the case of the baseline MCM 1, it is dedicated to the MIW mission and the VAMOSC 
data presented in this study accurately reflects the annual costs. For the future MIW 
alternatives, the LCS with planned mission packages and the alternative MK18 Mod 2, 
the platform supports many objectives of which MIW is one package. Therefore, 
although care was taken to provide accurate cost estimates of annual O&S costs based 
upon SME and stakeholder inputs, the actual costs of the MIW mission may vary from 
the estimates included in this study due to such factors as time spent dedicated to 
performing the MIW mission, time spent switching from one MP to another, and the 
impact of new mission requirements. To refine the accuracy of the study, comparison 
data based upon the hourly cost of each MIW mission was introduced as the manner to 
equate costs between the disparate systems, as the model collects data for the time spent 
on performing each task of the mission in hourly units. 
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2. Hourly O&S Cost Estimates for MIW Systems 
Cost data for each evaluated platform, legacy MCM 1, the CH-53E operating off 
of the LHD, LCS variant 1 (Freedom), and LCS variant 2 (Independence) with respective 
associated airborne assets of MH53 and with LCS variants the MH60, was obtained 
through the VAMOSC database tool as CY15 dollars for comparison. The yearly O&S 
cost estimations were decomposed, through similar manner as the MIW 2014 to remain 
consistent, into hourly rates for the shipboard assets by dividing the total yearly O&S cost 
by the number of hours in a year, 8760. Each asset’s operational costs were also broken 
down into several subcategories to include manpower, energy, maintenance and other to 
include those costs not included in another category but which still contributes to the 
operational cost of the asset such as training. The cost data in CY15 million dollar units 
for the ship assets are included in Appendix C – Table 18 through Table 28.  Costs 
associated with the operation of the MK18 Mod 2 as a MIW search asset through RHIB 
deployment were obtained through data provided by the MK18 evaluation team of SSC 
PAC and verified by operational representatives from N95. Manpower to support the 
operation of the MK18 Mod 2 is included within the operational costs of the RHIB and 
LCS manning.  
Airborne asset hourly calculations also started with the yearly O & S costs but 
differed from the shipboard values due to additional costs associated with flight hours 
and the type and location of the maintenance required. The costs associated with 
organizational and intermediate maintenance, those activities which can be accomplished 
within or near the deployed activity, were attributed to flight hours. Depot maintenance 
activities, those tasks which require specialized skills, materiel or facilities performed 
off-site from the task, were calculated using annual hours. Cost data in CY15 million 
dollar units are contained within Appendix C – Table 29 through Table 38.   
3. Neutralizer O&S Cost Analysis 
The cost of neutralizers obtained from SME feedback during the MIW 2014 
research was carried through to this study for consistency as the focus of this study was to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the MK18 Mod 2 as a search asset. The MK18 does not 
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have the ability to perform the neutralization aspects of the mission, operational 
commanders would need to employ current or alternate means of neutralization for MIW 
mission completeness. An assumption that the continued use of the current neutralization 
approaches of the LCS would be implemented in the short term. The costs associated 
with the current neutralization from an LCS platform using a MH-60 helicopter and 
Archerfish neutralizer were applied to the configurations containing the MK18 Mod 2. 
Data separating the MH-60 O&S costs in relation to the type of maintenance that occur 
annually for an airborne asset are contained in Appendix C – Table 26 and Table 27.   
The data for the neutralization systems used in the comparative systems are contained in 
Table 28.  Cost data of the neutralization systems was derived using triangle distributions 
and runs of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations, since the data provided was linear in nature 
the resulting simulations provided calculations for expected cost very close to a point 
estimate of the average of all costs entered. If greater granularity is sought in comparison 
between the legacy, current LCS and the use of the MK18 Mod 2 as an alternative search 
asset, a larger sample size of mission costs should be obtained for use as the 
representative sample size. 
4. Scenario Cost Estimates 
Estimates for each scenario were calculated from the requisite data contained in 
the tables above in combination with the resulting model output factors of number of 
neutralizers used, total mission time and flight time(s) contained in Chapter VII. Using 
the formula  for Total Estimated Cost derived by the 2014 MIW team below, the mission 
cost of using the MK18 Mod 2 in various quantities were calculated for comparison to 




A separate calculation sheet was derived for each combination of LCS variant and 
MK18 Mod 2 to account for the differentiation of O&S costs associated with the ship’s 
operation. All other MIW mission functions of the platforms were assumed to be of equal 
time, cost and effectiveness for this study. Representative samples for what was shown to 
be the most effective region using four and eight MK18 Mod 2s are included for clarity in 
Table 12 and Table 13.  The Total Estimated Costs for the mission of each variation is 
included in Appendix C – Table 29 through Table 38 with an isolation of the estimated 




Table 12.   Baseline Costs (4 MK18 Mod 2) 
 






































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 412.97 235.34 0.00 137.38 1.51 1.87 1.64 8.34 13.36 3.38
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 412.97 235.34 0.00 137.38 1.12 1.87 1.64 8.34 12.97 2.99





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 333.48 223.73 0.00 137.27 1.22 3.74 1.55 8.33 14.84 4.96
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 333.48 223.73 0.00 137.27 0.90 3.74 1.55 8.33 14.52 4.64
8 MK18 Mod2 BASELINE & HUNT Cost
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As with the results of the 2014 MIW team, the overall mission costs of the LCS 
variants consistently demonstrates the lowest mission costs in comparison to the legacy 
configurations. Among the LCS variants, the LCS 2 (Independence) maintains the lowest 
overall mission costs but the cost of the neutralization from all LCS configurations is also 
substantially higher than the legacy configurations as a result of the LCS variants reliance 
on airborne neutralizers. If alternative means of providing a surface neutralization method 
in conjunction with the search capabilities of the MK18 Mod 2 were to be implemented, 
the significant cost reductions provided by the MK18 Mod 2 as a search asset could allow 
for the implementation of multiple devices to further increase the confidence level in 
identifying mines and non-mines. Such a reduction in identification time and cost, at 
equal or greater confidence than currently modeled, would allow operational 
commanders the opportunity to realize a reduction in the number of neutralizers 
expended thereby further increasing the operational effectiveness of the MIW mission. 
This excursion provides areas of interest for future studies to examine the potential of 
designating the MIW mission among multiple platforms equipped with MK18 Mod 2 and 
alternate neutralization methods. The cost data results are based upon point estimates 
derived from limited cost information obtained through VAMOSC and SME feedback, a 
larger sample size would be desirable to provide proper probability distributions. The full 
collection of results based upon derived point estimates is contained in Appendix C Table 
18 through Table 28.    
Further research into the probabilistic cost distributions is warranted for 
estimation of the number of MK18 Mod 2 to determine a predictive formula for the 
optimal ACRS to cost ratios under the ideal conditions presented in the model. Metrics 
for establishing the baseline performance versus cost were calculated by dividing the 
configurations modeled ACRS by the cost, with the results graphically displayed are 
contained in Appendix C - Figure 42 through Figure 61 for each configuration and 
combination of MK18 Mod 2 with baseline and normalized performance displayed. 
Representative graphics (Figure 23 through Figure 26) for the use of four and eight 
MK18 Mod 2s as the search asset are displayed below to illustrate the relative ACRS to 
mission cost and normalized percent clearance effectiveness of the MK18 Mod 2 





Figure 23.  ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (4 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 25.  ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (8 MK18 Mod 2) 
 
 
Figure 26.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (8 MK18 Mod 2) 
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The results of ACRS performance when normalized indicate that the MK18 Mod 
2 equals the search effectiveness of the programmed LCS MCM mission package when 
four devices are deployed using two RHIBs, for which the current configuration of the 
LCS is capable of hosting. This effectiveness is obtained within the model using only one 
MH-60 helicopter for neutralization, as an excursion removal of this airborne assets 
neutralization function was performed to investigate only hunt aspect of the mission. 
Using the same metrics as the prior calculations, minus the airborne costs and 
times it was determined that at this same value of four MK18 Mod 2 devices performing 
the search function it became superior to the currently deployed option. While a brief 
excursion in this effort was performed to support the team’s hypothesis of the limiting 
factor being the MH-60, the results for the representative selection of four and eight 
MK18 Mod 2s are shown in Figure 27 through Figure 28 indicated the potential as a 
viable search asset when paired with either a more effective neutralization system or 
equipped with better detection and discrimination characteristics. An alternate 
neutralization system could also be deployed from alternate platforms as well to satisfy 
portions of the MIW mission more effectively. The full collection of results of the 
excursion is contained in Appendix C Figure 62 through Figure 71.  
 
Figure 27.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (4 MK18 Mod 2) 





















Figure 28.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (8 MK18 Mod 2) 
The data indicates that within the LCS MIW mission package, a limiting factor in 
overall effectiveness may be the reliance on airborne neutralization provided by the 
MH60 shared among all of the LCS configurations modeled or the lower Pd and Pc 
variables modeled for the MK18 Mod 2. Given that the LCS variants have lower O&S 
costs as provided to the team, the slightly broader range of the probability of detection of 
the LCS with the MK18 Mod 2 was not of consequence once the number of MK18 Mod 
2 performing the search portion of the mission exceeded three devices operating 
simultaneously. 
While the data provided above support the addition of the MK18 Mod 2 as a 
search asset within the MIW mission, to effectively compare the results of the prior 2014 
MIW capstone report, as shared with the 2015 MIW team through interactions with 
stakeholders and SMEs, the most readily accepted metric by the community is mission 
effectiveness as measured through percent clearance. While the MK18 Mod 2 does not 
perform any of the clearance functions, as mentioned in the previous discussions on 
searching, effective clearance is directly related to the reliable detection and identification 
of mines as mines, and elimination as MILCO, which due to their uncertain nature could 
potentially waste neutralizers. Therefore, the confidence an operational commander can 
have about the information provided about the subject minefield is paramount to 
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Figure 29 through Figure 30 show the normalized results with the inclusion of the 
neutralization into the overall mission costs when using the modeled MIW packages in 
deployments utilizing four and eight MK18 Mod 2s as the search asset for comparison. 
The full analysis for all modeled configurations is contained within Appendix C – Figure 
72 through Figure 81.  
  
Figure 29.  Normalized % Clearance vs. Mission Cost (4 MK18 Mod 2) 
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As shown in the above graphical representations of the normalized percent 
clearance to total mission cost, the LCS MIW search alternative utilizing the MK18 Mod 
2 provides mission package with the most cost effective solution modeled. These results 
confirm with the earlier results of the isolation of the search function in which the models 
suggested the MK18 Mod 2 package as the most cost effective in that area. Although the 
two LCS packages modeled utilize the same neutralization method, the MH60 and 
Archerfish neutralizer, the supporting cost data indicates the number of neutralizers 
expended and the additional cost of the MK18 Mod 2 and RHIB do not adversely affect 
the overall mission effectiveness when compared with the current LCS MIW package. As 
indicated earlier, the probability of detection provided and used in this study was of a 
broader range than the devices contained in the prior year’s study suggesting that if the 
probability were raised to values consistent with the current package the associated 
overall mission costs could also result in realizing a corresponding reduction.   
B. RISK ANALYSIS 
A formal risk analysis was not performed in this study due to time and resource 
constraints, although a cursory evaluation was instituted for the employment of the 
MK18 Mod 2 only. The risks identified in the 2014 MIW study remain relevant to this 
study and have been applied to the MK18 Mod 2 deployment as well. The MK18 Mod 2s 
use as presented in this model assumed that the devices would be released and recovered 
outside of the actual minefield with transit to and from the host ship to the mission area 
via the RHIB. Employment of the devices in this manner is in line with the goal of 
removing the warfighter from the minefield to reduce risk to an acceptable level or 
below. Since risk is a major contributor to how effective a solution is, particularly within 
a military scenario, an in-depth analysis of employment of the MK18 Mod 2 warrants 
additional study for determination of the level of risk implementing the search aspect of 
the MIW mission may be incurred. 
1. Risk Assessment Methodology 
The identification and management of risk is necessary in any DOD program and 
is performed in a methodical manner as prescribed by the Under Secretary of Defense 
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(USD) Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L). “Risk management is the 
overarching process that encompasses identification, analysis, mitigation planning, 
mitigation plan implementation and tracking” (Department of Defense 2006, 1). Risk is 
comprised of three primary components: 
• a future root cause, which if addressed can eliminate, reduce or prevent an 
occurrence 
• a probability of occurrence 
• a consequence or effect upon occurrence 
Due to the scope of this study only the factors of identification, analysis and 
mitigation planning were conducted. These efforts were also limited to only the risk 
associated with the MK18 Mod 2 as a search asset.  
Identification of the risks for the MK18 Mod 2 was facilitated through the 
literature reviews, stakeholder and SME inputs. Risks are events that have not occurred 
yet, but may impact cost, schedule or performance of a system; therefore, when 
evaluating the risks associated with the use of the MK18, only those items which have 
not yet been realized were considered. This evaluation was also a cursory look into the 
risks associated with the use of the MK18 Mod 2 and is not all inclusive of all potential 
risks in operation. 
The analysis risks identified follows in the process, with the objective of this 
phase the development of analytical support for the decisions for estimates of likelihood 
and consequence of each identified risk. A mapping of the established levels of likelihood 
corresponding to probability of occurrence was obtained from the USD/AT&L Risk 
Management Guidebook, Sixth Edition and is included for reference in Table 14 and 






Table 14.   Levels of Likelihood Criteria (source: USD/AT&L, 2006) 
Level Likelihood Probability of Occurrence 
1 Not Likely ~10% 
2 Low Likelihood ~30% 
3 Likely ~50% 
4 Highly Likely ~70% 
5 Near Certainty ~90% 
 
Table 15.   Levels of Consequence Criteria (source: USD/AT&L, 2006) 
Level Technical Performance 
1 Minimal or no consequence to technical performance 
2 
Minor reduction in technical performance or 
supportability, can be tolerated with little or no impact 
on program objectives 
3 
Moderate reduction in technical performance or 
supportability with limited impact on program 
objectives 
4 
Significant degradation in technical performance or 
major shortfall in supportability, may jeopardize 
program success 
5 
Severe degradation in technical performance: cannot 
meet KPP or key technical/supportability threshold; 
will jeopardize program success 
 
 
Plots of the likelihood and consequence are regularly plotted on a “Risk Cube” 
using a scale of 1–5, providing a two dimensional representation of the intersection of 
likelihood and consequence. A sample Risk Cube is shown in Figure 31.  
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Figure 31.  Sample Risk Cube (source: USD/AT&L Risk Management Guidebook, 
2006) 
Similar to the identification of the risks, estimation of the likelihood and 
consequences associated with the risks were obtained through literature reviews, 
interactions with stakeholders, SMEs and some input learned from evaluation of the 
M&S performed during this study. 
To conclude the limited risk assessment for this project was the development of 
mitigation plans to address the risk in the event of occurrence. Risk mitigation hopes to 
create an alternative approach in advance which may be implemented when the 
acceptable risk level is realized. Mitigation can include all or some of the behaviors listed 
below: 
• Avoidance – the root cause of the risk is eliminated. 
• Controlling – the root cause of the risk is managed to avoid occurrence. 
• Transference – the responsibility of the root cause of the risk is transferred 
to another party. 
• Assumption – the risk is accepted by management. 
The risk mitigation suggestions presented in this study have been developed by 
the 2015 MIW through information obtained during the course of this evaluation. 
2. MK18 Mod 2 Risk Assessment 
A summary of the risks identified with the use of the MK18 Mod 2, along with 
proposed mitigation strategies are contained in Figure 32. These risks address the 
technical system risks and do not cover costs or schedule. A detailed explanation of the 
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risk, likelihood, consequence and mitigation strategy follow to provide greater detail of 
the proposal. 
 
Figure 32.  Risk Summary for MK18 Mod 2 (adapted from Frank et al. 2014) 
The risks associated with deploying the MK18 Mod 2 as a search asset are: 
• Risk A: Sea state at three or above. 
• Risk Statement: If the sea state is determined to be at three or 
above, the MK18 Mod 2 cannot be relied upon to remain on track 
and operate in a predictable manner. 
• Likelihood: 2 
• Rationale: Average sea state in the Persian gulf is three 
and below 75% of the time (Bulton 2007) 
• Consequence: 2 
• Rationale: In sea states above three nearly all other MIW 
assets become less reliable in probability of detection and 
would also incur the need for re-identification of objects to 
currents. 
• Risk B: MK18 Mod 2 cannot be deployed. 
• Risk Statement: If the MK18 Mod 2 malfunctions after transit 
operations have begun, the sortie for that device must be 
abandoned until a replacement is deployed. 
• Likelihood: 2 
• Rationale: Notional data provided by MK18 Mod 2 SME 
based upon operational experience rated the reliability high, 
although normal maintenance is required. 
• Consequence: 3 
• Rationale: If a MK18 Mod 2 were to fail, due to the 
preprogramming of the search area the area which the 
device would have searched during the planned sortie 
would have to be searched by an alternate device. 
Risk B: MK18 Mod 2 cannot be 
deployed. 
Statement: If there is a failure 
within the MK18 system prior to 
launch, the sortie cannot complete. 
Mitigation Strategy:  
(1) Continue sortie with 
remaining MK18, replenish 
with spare. 
 
Risk A: MK18 Mod 2 cannot be 
deployed. 
Statement: MK18 Mod 2 cannot 
be deployed in sea states 3 and 
above 
Mitigation Strategy:  
(1) Delay operations until 





C. COST AND RISK CONCLUSIONS 
Our study has concluded that the MK18 Mod 2 is an effective alternative or 
additional search asset to the LCS MIW package, current and legacy MIW methods when 
implemented with between four and eight devices performing the search function. Using 
the cost estimates for the analysis, based upon the data provided variant 2 of the LCS 
with the MK18 Mod 2 performing the search function has been shown to have the highest 
ACRS and percent clearance values for the overall mission when the search function is 
isolated and the highest ACRS regardless of search isolation. Recommendations to 
improve the neutralization function will increase the effectiveness of the LCS in any 
configuration, but in particular those implementing the MK18 Mod 2, can raise the 
overall effectiveness of the LCS MIW variants. While the risk analysis performed in this 
study was limited to only a cursory view of the potential technical system risks, a major 
benefit of implementing the MK18 Mod 2 as an alternative search asset is its ability to 
allow the warfighter to have the MIW mine search function performed by an autonomous 
vehicle which allows the removal of the need for human entry into the hazardous areas. 
To further refine the results indicated within this study in regards to both cost and risk a 
focused study in these areas is a recommendation made by the 2014 MIW team as a 
logical follow on effort. 
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IX. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study set out as a follow-on to the MIW 2014 capstone report in Mine 
Warfare. The goal of that study was to compare legacy and future MCM capabilities in a 
single scenario. The MIW 2015 Capstone project set out to do further work that would 
maintain backwards compatibility with the MIW 2014 project while analyzing new 
solutions to the MCM problem. 
A. SUMMARY 
As described in Chapter II, a tailored systems engineering process was utilized in 
order to conduct the Team MIW 2015 capstone project. This tailored engineering process 
started with stakeholder analysis, leading to the formulation of a primitive need to 
compare the MK18 Mod 2 UUV as a search asset in place of the Program of Record 
(POR) LCS RMS. This primitive need led to the formulation of an effective need, 
capability need, and finally to the problem statement. The problem statement thus 
formulated was “The MIW community needs to develop a comprehensive comparative 
solution to clearly define the gaps between legacy, future, and projected MCM 
capabilities while providing recommendations involving effectiveness and value for the 
conduct of sound tradeoff decisions.”  This statement was used, with stakeholder 
feedback, to determine requirements that were achievable, realistic, and meaningful to the 
MIW community.   
While formulating the problem statement, extensive literature reviews were 
conducted allowing Team MIW 2015 to learn about MIW in general and the problems 
faced over its history. Further consultation with SMEs occurred during the course of this 
project to answer questions as the team developed a greater understanding of MIW and 
the needs of the community in developing this study. To focus our search, research 
questions were developed that guided the team in order to ensure that all necessary 
information was obtained from experts or literature in a comprehensive fashion that 
furthered the objectives of this study. 
Building from the MIW 2014 study, functional and physical architectures were 
adapted in order to describe the MK18 Mod 2 UUV and its operation in place of an LCS 
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RMS. Guided by this, the ARMS model was modified with data describing the MK18s 
characteristics in varying numbers in order to compare to the top performing legacy and 
LCS configurations modeled by Team MIW 2014. The results of this data were subjected 
to cost analysis utilizing the best available cost information in order to determine the 
cost-effectiveness of each configuration. The conclusions and recommendations are 
discussed in the next two sub-chapters. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Utilizing the input ranges introduced in Chapter VI, this study found that four 
MK18s provided a greater ACRS in this scenario than either the legacy or the LCS MCM 
MP configurations. Summary data for all configurations is presented in Table 16, 
originally appearing in Chapter VII. Further increases were seen all the way up to 12 
MK18s, but the rate of increase decreased significantly and there appear to be 
diminishing returns. Team MIW 2015 theorizes that this may be due to the ‘bottleneck’ 
of utilizing one neutralization asset. This can be seen graphically in Figure 33, also 
originally appearing in Chapter VII. However, time constraints prevented the team from 
exploring this potential limitation further and results in a future recommendation. 
While percent clearance remained the same for all MK18 configurations modeled, 
this number was significantly lower than that for the legacy configurations. This is likely 
due to the differing input ranges provided by SMEs for the MK18s probability of 
detection and probability of classification of both mines and non-mines. The ranges 
provided by the SMEs for the MK18 were significantly lower than those provided by the 
SMEs for the LCS RMS. It is possible that these ranges are not indicative of the relative 
performance between these two separate search assets as two separate teams provided 
these ranges that were intended to remain in the unclassified realm. As the MK18 has 
been utilized operationally in 5th Fleet for several years it likely has significant 
operational data whereas the LCS RMS has not yet deployed. As a result, these percent 
clearance numbers are not comparable in practice, and this also resulted in a future 
recommendation in the next chapter. 
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Table 16.   Summary of Configuration Performance 
  






Configuration Lower Upper Lower Upper 
2A 5.35 5.25 5.45 0.33 0.32 0.34 
3 4.80 4.71 4.89 0.33 0.32 0.34 
1M 1.80 1.79 1.81 0.26 0.26 0.26 
2M 3.51 3.48 3.54 0.26 0.26 0.26 
3M 5.00 4.96 5.03 0.26 0.26 0.26 
4M 6.05 6.01 6.09 0.26 0.26 0.26 
5M 6.72 6.67 6.76 0.26 0.26 0.26 
6M 7.18 7.13 7.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 
7M 7.40 7.35 7.46 0.26 0.26 0.26 
8M 7.59 7.53 7.65 0.26 0.26 0.26 
9M 7.71 7.64 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26 
10M 7.80 7.73 7.86 0.26 0.26 0.26 
12M 7.95 8.01 8.01 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 
 
Figure 33.  Mean of ACRS vs. Configuration 
O&S cost comparisons were conducted between the various configurations, and 





















per mission on a pure cost basis than any MK18 configuration. However, when cost 
versus ACRS is considered, four or more MK18s provide equal or greater value than all 
other legacy or LCS configurations as illustrated in Figure 34.  
Table 17.   Summary of Cost Data 
 
 





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/1 MK18 Mod2 1415.85 272.70 0.00 137.62 5.18 0.88 2.09 8.35 16.51 6.06
LCS2 w/1 MK18 Mod2 1415.85 272.70 0.00 137.62 3.84 0.88 2.09 8.35 15.17 4.72
LCS1 w/2 MK18 Mod2 721.88 251.07 0.00 137.86 2.64 0.93 1.81 8.37 13.75 3.57
LCS2 w/2 MK18 Mod2 721.88 251.07 0.00 137.86 1.96 0.93 1.81 8.37 13.07 2.89
LCS1 w/3 MK18 Mod2 503.21 241.17 0.00 137.40 1.84 1.82 1.70 8.34 13.70 3.66
LCS2 w/3 MK18 Mod2 503.21 241.17 0.00 137.40 1.36 1.82 1.70 8.34 13.22 3.18
LCS1 w/4 MK18 Mod2 412.97 235.34 0.00 137.38 1.51 1.87 1.64 8.34 13.36 3.38
LCS2 w/4 MK18 Mod2 412.97 235.34 0.00 137.38 1.12 1.87 1.64 8.34 12.97 2.99
LCS1 w/5 MK18 Mod2 372.12 231.83 0.00 137.40 1.36 2.75 1.61 8.34 14.06 4.12
LCS2 w/5 MK18 Mod2 372.12 231.83 0.00 137.40 1.01 2.75 1.61 8.34 13.71 3.76
LCS1 w/6 MK18 Mod2 350.17 228.04 0.00 136.98 1.28 2.80 1.58 8.32 13.98 4.08
LCS2 w/6 MK18 Mod2 350.17 228.04 0.00 136.98 0.95 2.80 1.58 8.32 13.65 3.75
LCS2 w/7 MK18 Mod2 340.62 226.46 0.00 137.54 1.25 3.69 1.57 8.35 14.85 4.93
LCS1 w/7 MK18 Mod2 340.62 226.46 0.00 137.54 0.92 3.69 1.57 8.35 14.53 4.61
LCS1 w/8 MK18 Mod2 333.48 223.73 0.00 137.27 1.22 3.74 1.55 8.33 14.84 4.96
LCS2 w/8 MK18 Mod2 333.48 223.73 0.00 137.27 0.90 3.74 1.55 8.33 14.52 4.64
LCS1 w/9 MK18 Mod2 329.05 222.04 0.00 137.25 1.20 4.62 1.53 8.33 15.69 5.83
LCS2 w/9 MK18 Mod2 329.05 222.04 0.00 137.25 0.89 4.62 1.53 8.33 15.38 5.52
LCS1 w/10 MK18 Mod2 325.51 220.28 0.00 137.34 1.19 4.67 1.52 8.34 15.72 5.86














































































C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
As future teams endeavor to further MIW, it will be necessary that they conduct 
their own stakeholder analysis to determine what problems are in greatest need of 
solution within their work scope and constraints; however, these are areas that Team 
MIW 2015 believes would provide both adequate work for a future capstone project as 
well as provide meaningful information to the MIW community. 
1. Conduct Classified Analysis 
The data utilized in this study consisted of unclassified ranges provided by system 
SMEs.  This information is meant to be representative of the ability of these MCM assets 
to conduct operations as depicted in this specific operational scenario.  As a result, while 
comparisons can be derived from the data as runs, these comparisons are incomplete and 
cannot be refined until the actual data is inserted, the model executed, and the outputs 
reanalyzed.  This model should be moved into a classified enclave and populated with the 
exact data, as determined by SMEs that represent these systems in the given scenario in 
order to draw direct comparisons of these systems.  This includes complete cost data that 
Team MIW 2015 did not have. 
NATO allies also have requirements to meet specific MCM missions and there 
may be an opportunity to leverage this study to provide comparison data.  This would 
benefit foreign countries as well as our own.  This type of comparison would provide the 
opportunity to analyze their solutions against those of the U.S. Navy in particular 
scenarios.  This could result in a “best of breed” type of systems synthesis that might 
result in a synergistic combination of allied technologies allowing for a better application 
of military resources to combat the MCM problem. 
2. Alter the Operational Scenario 
This model utilized an Operational Scenario as presented in Chapter V. This 
scenario was based on deep water, bottom mines only, and a fixed 10x10 grid. Future 
studies should strongly consider altering this scenario in order to compare the removal 
capabilities between configurations when multiple mine types are considered. This would 
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result in significant changes to the existing model to accommodate. This would 
necessitate programming experience on the part of the capstone team.   
In addition to differing mine types, adding different field configurations such as 
would be expected for route clearance would be of significant benefit to the warfighter. 
Initial mine hunting operations involve clearing a channel to enable access by allied 
forces and merchant vessels in order to further military ends or ensure the flow of trade 
goods. These breakthrough scenarios can involve clearance operations up to and 
including ports which necessitate the consideration of varying bottom depths. 
Additionally, various search systems have differing sensor configurations that balance 
different tradeoffs.  Simulating these differences could provide insight to the best 
methods for utilization of differing technologies.  Adding further fidelity to the model 
could also enhance understanding, such as sea state, temperature, bottom types, and 
salinity. 
3. Enhance Understanding of the Current Scenario 
The current scenario involving MK18s in place of the LCS RMS offers several 
avenues for continued study. This study noted apparent limitations or “bottlenecking” 
when the numbers of MK18s continued to increase. While it was theorized that the single 
neutralization asset was the limiting factor, this is only a possible explanation, and further 
investigation is necessary to understand the cause of this decreasing return. 
The MK18 is not the only potential expanded search asset for the LCS MCM MP. 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) are part of future LCS MCM increments and could 
offer another alternative to the LCS RMS as a search asset. This investigation has been 
proposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) as well as the MK18 as 
potential replacements for the LCS RMS (Rear Admiral Rick Williams, USN (Ret), 
personal comm.). There may be other potential RMS replacements as well that the 
authors are not aware of. 
This study assumed that there would be one RHIB for every two MK18s. This 
was done to simplify the modeling process. However, the LCS is only capable of carrying 
two total RHIBs. While this means that the four MK18 scenario, as currently modeled, is 
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still viable, larger numbers of MK18s would require some other process than that 
considered here. One potential solution would be multiple trips between RHIBs, each 
depositing two MK18s, then returning to pick up two more and repeat. At mission 
conclusion, MK18s would be recovered in a similar fashion. This would require 
significant changes to the existing model in order to simulate, but this concept of 
operations is more likely to be utilized and would provide further cost savings for larger 
numbers of MK18s. 
4. Alter MIW Model Underlying Assumptions 
The current ARMS model that was initially created by Team MIW 2014 and 
further utilized by Team MIW 2015 with some modification makes the assumption that 
the systems modeled begin neutralization operations as soon as initial contacts are found. 
However, in discussion with SMEs it became apparent that in most SLOC scenarios, this 
may not be the best option. Most SMEs polled discussed the desire to map the entire field 
in order to determine the areas of lowest density and clear the necessary channel where 
mine density is lowest. This change to the model would be significant but also would 
solve many of the problems that were initially encountered during this capstone project. 
As this may have more applicability to the warfighter, this future change should be 
considered. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the work presented in this report was summarized, conclusions 
were presented, and recommendations for future study were offered.  While specific 
conclusions were given, it is important to remember that this study utilized representative 
ranges of data in order to remain in the unclassified domain.  This study is tentative until 
a classified analysis can be performed.  Results relating to ACRS, heavily dependent on 
the speed of the search sensor, are more relevant than those relating to the sensors.  
More work is needed to move the U.S. Navy further along in combating an age 
old enemy, the naval mine.  Modern technology offers the possibility of combating this 
threat more effectively than ever before with less risk to personnel.  Only with continued 
effort into research, while properly funded, will this goal be realized.  Partnerships with 
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our allies will assist.  As always, the active, reserve, and civilian personnel of the U.S. 
Navy and her allies stand ready to meet the challenge presented, now and in the future.  
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APPENDIX A – PROGRAMS AND TOOLS 
This appendix provides a description of the programs and tools that were utilized 
for this capstone study. It includes details of ExtendSim, Innoslate, CORE, Minitab, and 
JMP™ along with how the 2015 MIW team accessed and utilized each one.  
 
EXTENDSIM – The team utilized the ExtendSim software package. ExtendSim 
is developed by Imagine That Incorporated and is a software application tool that allows 
the user to simulate any system by creating logical representations of it. These 
representations are created using building blocks that enable the user to build their own 
specialized application model. The building blocks are connected together via graphical 
user interfaces to create the logical flow of the model as illustrated in Figure 35. When 
constructing a model, data resides within the parameters of the blocks and in a database. 
 
Figure 35.  ExtendSim Logical Flow Example  
ExtendSim also has the capability to customize the behavior of blocks with their 
programming language called ModL. ExtendSim is designed for rapid prototyping so that 
basic functionality can be achieved quickly and then additional complexity or fidelity can 
be added as needed, which is facilitated by allowing unlimited hierarchical 
decomposition to allow the user to produce a modular design with reusable components 
(Frank et al. 2014). The team accessed this software package from the NPS CloudLab 
and/or personal licensed copies. 
 
INNOSLATE – The team utilized the Innoslate software package. Innoslate is 
developed by Spec Innovations and is a software based tool for requirements traceability 
and architecture views. It is designed to scale to very large projects and allows the team 
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to coordinate and receive updates regarding project status, database changes, and model 
maturity within a project dashboard. Innoslate was used to develop the physical and 
functional diagrams for this project. The team accessed this web based software package 
from their personal computers.  
 
CORE – The team utilized the CORE software package. CORE is developed by 
Vitec Corporation and is a model-based system engineering software tool combining 
modeling language and MBSE methodology. It was developed to serve a systems 
engineering purpose where by system requirements, behavior, architecture, verification, 
and validation are pieces that can be decomposed to provide full system information in an 
organized manner. CORE takes complex issues and organizes the concepts and 
requirements. It models the behavior of a system and interacts with the concept of 
operations. It manages requirements and decomposes down to system functionality with 
complete system behavior analysis, and simulates system performance. CORE also 
develops and traces system architecture down to subsystems and components while 
providing traceability from system design to verification and validation plans and 
procedures. The team accessed this software package from their personal computers. 
 
MINITAB – The team utilized the Minitab software application. Minitab is a tool 
for statistical data analysis. It allows the user to display the statistic results and other 
outputs as well as the actual data being used. The team accessed this software package 
from their personal computers or from the NPS CloudLab. 
 
JMP – The team utilized the JMP software application. JMP is an interactive and 
visual tool for statistical data analysis very similar to Minitab. The main difference is that 
the team utilized JMP for a specialized focus on partitioning the output dataset results to 
calculate the most optimum set of factors for ACRS and % Clearance. The team accessed 
this software package from their personal computers or from the NPS CloudLab. 
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APPENDIX B – NAVY MISSIONS 
This appendix provides a discussion of the U.S. Navy’s assigned missions of sea 
control, forward presence, power projection, deterrence, maritime security, and 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.  It presents these missions as seen from a systems 
engineering approach using tools such as EFFBDs and functional decompositions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Navy Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1) defines six core capabilities of 
Naval Forces. These are forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, 
maritime security, and HA/DR (U.S. Navy 2010). These core capabilities are the 
theoretical basis for everything the Navy does. However, the linking documentation 
defining the connection between these required capabilities and the actual physical Navy 
components that perform these missions does not exist (Vego 2008). Naval Warfare 
Publication 3-15 (NWP) 3–15, Naval Mine Warfare, defines Naval Mine Warfare as it 
currently exists, but ultimately is lacking in its description as there is no higher 
framework on which it is based (Vego 2008). NWP 3–15 is a good description of what 
existing MIW missions and capabilities are, and the components that fulfill them, but 
there is no adjoining framework describing how these missions, capabilities, and 
resulting components fit into the overall national strategy as defined by the President, 
Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). 
NAVY MISSIONS 
In applying an SE approach to navy missions, dependencies among these 
capabilities are clearly evident. As defined in NDP-1, these are equal mission areas as 
shown in Figure 36.   
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Figure 36.  Navy Capabilities 
(1) Sea Control 
Throughout history, control of the sea has been a precursor to victory in 
war. Sea control is the essence of sea power and is a necessary ingredient 
in the successful accomplishment of all naval missions. Naval forces 
execute sea-control operations to prevent or limit the spread of conflict as 
well as to prevail in war. Sea control and power projection complement 
one another. Sea control allows naval forces to close within striking 
distance to remove landward threats to access, which in turn enhances 
freedom of action at sea. Freedom of action at sea enables the projection 
of forces ashore. Sea-control operations are the employment of naval 
forces, supported by land, air, and other forces as appropriate, in order to 
achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations include 
destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, 
protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority 
in areas of naval operations. (U.S. Navy 2010, 27) 
(2) Forward Presence 
U.S. naval forces are forward deployed around the clock. These forces 
support a Combatant Commander’s (CCDR’s) theater campaign plan. The 
forward operating posture serves several key functions: it enables 
familiarity with the operational environment, as well as contributing to an 
understanding of the capabilities, culture, and behavior patterns of 
regional actors, and it enables influence. This understanding and influence 
facilitate more effective responses in the event of crisis. Should peacetime 
operations transition to war, commanders and commanding officers will 
have developed their naval forces’ environmental and operational 
understanding and experience to successfully engage in combat 
operations. Forward presence also allows us to combat terrorism as far 
from U.S. shores as possible. Where and when applicable, forward-
deployed naval forces isolate, capture, or destroy terrorists and their 
infrastructure, resources, and sanctuaries, preferably in conjunction with 
coalition partners. (U.S. Navy 2010, 26) 
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(3) Power Projection 
As a largely sea-based force, the naval team can overcome diplomatic, 
military, and geographic challenges to access and project power ashore 
without reliance on ports and airfields in the objective area. In an era of 
declining access, naval forces play a critical role in projecting U.S. power 
overseas. Naval forces that are persistently present and combat-ready 
provide the United States primary forcible entry option, even as they 
provide the means to respond quickly to other crises. The ability to 
overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain power ashore is 
the basis of combat credibility and deterrence capability. (U.S. Navy 2010, 
29) 
(4) Deterrence 
Deterrence is “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence 
is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable 
counteraction” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2010, 67).  
The term generally refers to a strategy, in any potential conflict, of being 
prepared to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary and making sure 
the potential adversary is aware of the risk so that the adversary refrains 
from aggression. U.S. naval forces maintain that core capability and, 
through employments and capabilities, deter adversaries from aggressive 
actions on U.S. partners. These naval forces’ capabilities include sea-
based nuclear weapons and the forward posturing of credible conventional 
combat power in key regions, as well as the ability to surge forces tailored 
to meet emerging crises. (U.S. Navy 2010, 26) 
(5) Maritime Security 
Naval forces conduct operations throughout the maritime domain and 
view the oceans not as an obstacle but as the base of operations and 
maneuver space, which we either can control for our own use or deny an 
opponent. Whenever naval forces face an adversary without formidable 
fleet assets such as carriers, submarines, and larger surface combatants, 
the seas serve as barriers for naval force defense. As important, though, 
the seas provide avenues of world trade and military lines of 
communications for the United States, its allies, and its friends. (U.S. 
Navy 2010, 29). 
(6) Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) 
The capabilities that allow naval forces to project combat power are also 
effective at responding to the world’s natural disasters. Operating without 
reliance on ports and airfields ashore and in possession of organic medical 
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support, strategic and tactical lift, logistics support, robust 
communications capabilities, and premier planning and coordination tools, 
naval forces are ideally suited for HA/DR, as the vast majority of the 
world’s population lives within a few hundred miles of the seas and 
oceans. (U.S. Navy 2010, 30) 
 NAVY MISSIONS AS A CAMPAIGN 
Joint Publications (JPs) are the basis for all service level publications. This 
includes NDP-1. NDP-1 references JP 3–0 to describe the six phases of a campaign. 
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, describes six phases of an operation or 
campaign: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable 
civil authority. While phases are usually conceived and depicted as 
sequential in nature, as a practical matter there may be considerable 
overlap and simultaneity among phases. (U.S. Navy 2010, 38) 
NDP-1 further ties the six mission areas and their significance to these six 
campaign phases, setting an expected mission hierarchy. In Figure 37, the six core 
capabilities are shown on the y-axis, and the six campaign phases are shown on the x-
axis. From here, you can see how for phase zero, the predominant required naval 
capability is maritime security. This then leads into forward presence and deterrence 
during phase one. Sea control and power projection are the predominant capabilities 
required for phase three. HA/DR never particularly dominates as a required capability, 
though in terms of campaign planning it is most likely to occur once the objective action 
has been completed, in this case phase four. As the campaign comes to an end, maritime 
security once again dominates returning full circle to phase zero operations. Graphically 
depicts this arrangement. This also serves to demonstrate how the Navy’s missions are 
not neatly tied to a campaign, but are always utilized in some capacity regardless. It is not 
the intent here to debate the merits of the Joint Service campaign system, but there are 
logical shortcomings that cannot be ignored. 
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Figure 37.  Campaign Phases (source: U.S. Navy 2010) 
 DEPENDENCIES AMONG U.S. NAVY MISSIONS 
As shown in Figure 36, the U.S. Navy core capabilities are described and 
discussed in some detail, and through this discussion there are a series of dependencies 
required among them in order for the successful conduct of each mission area. Once these 
dependencies are diagrammed it will become apparent that the campaign phasing above 
is in error when applied to Navy missions. 
First, as shown in Figure 38, all mission areas require sea control in order for 
successful implementation. Sea control is necessary for all combatants, whether singly or 
in groups, in order to safely conduct operations. An Aegis cruiser has complete control of 
the airspace within its radar range. A battle group with an E-2 Hawkeye airborne not only 
dominates the airspace but also has detailed knowledge of and the ability to eliminate any 
surface threat within its radar horizon. A Navy unit does not get underway without some 
minimal degree of control of its surroundings.   
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Figure 38.  Initial Navy Missions EFFBD 
Sea control is not the only dependency to consider. Power projection requires 
some form of forward presence, as does maritime security and deterrence. We then arrive 
at the description shown in Figure 39.  Consider this in the context of a deploying Carrier 
Battle Group (CVBG) moving under orders to the Indian Ocean. The battle group gets 
underway. Immediately upon clearing the piers, the individual units making up the battle 
group control a large volume including air, sea, land, and space around them. Not only is 
the battle group aware of its surroundings, but has the capability to perform a large 
number of desired effects on anything in range. This state continues to exist throughout 
its transit to the desired operating area south of India. 
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Figure 39.  U.S. Navy Missions EFFBD 
Once the CVBG has completed transiting to the Indian Ocean, it maintains sea 
control around the battle group. Due to the battle groups proximity to various foreign 
countries, forward presence is now established. With this forward presence, any of the 
four remaining missions can be executed. 
These simple arrangements are not meant to be all inclusive, rather this is a brief 
study meant to demonstrate the need for further work in this area. The U.S. Navy’s 
architectural structure, currently based around current capability and force structure, 
could benefit greatly from the application of functional analysis in describing a desired 
future state.   
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Figure 40 shows an as-is functional architecture under the capability area of sea 
control. As the U.S. Navy is currently organized, it divides into warfare areas that are 
designed to counter specific threats, as in this example, the primary warfare areas of Anti-
Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). 
The Navy then defines specialty warfare areas of Naval Special Warfare (NSW), MIW, 
and Cyber Warfare (CYW). This decomposition is a reflection of existing arrangements, 
but is not typically representative of engineering design.   
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Figure 40.  Sea Control Current Functional Decomposition 
Systems engineering philosophy requires that a functional decomposition be 
solution agnostic. Figure 41 demonstrates a functional decomposition representative of 
systems thinking. This allows for creative solutions to be created that do not rely on 
existing paradigms. This is not a be-all way of doing, as focus on new and innovative 
thinking can obscure simpler solutions based on existing systems. 
 
Figure 41.  Sea Control Solution Agnostic Decomposition 
Figure 41 shows many functions necessary in sea control without specifying how 
or where they would occur. First, allied forces need to search the area for other contacts. 
This is further decomposed by detection, classification, and identification activities. 
Allied forces need to be able to communicate within this area, and perform command and 
control functions. Finally, the need for offensive and defensive functions are the core of 




This chapter was written in order to suggest that our current national direction, 
from the President down to the individual services, could benefit from an engineering 
functional analysis to determine a more effective structure for future military operations. 
This starts with clear national objectives that can be further decomposed down to 
individual military functions allowing for a complete functional to physical component 
mapping to take place. This ensures that only necessary functions are fulfilled, and 
clearly defines the order in which functions are necessary for the overall mission, 
allowing for a more precise allocation of national effort. 
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APPENDIX C – COST FIGURES AND TABLES 
This appendix includes all of the cost data figures and tables. It provides the 
detailed results that were not included in Chapter VIII. This appendix begins with the 
annual O&S costs. It continues with the ACRS baseline, normalized ACRS baseline, 
normalized ACRS hunt, normalized percent clearance, and baseline cost charts for each 
of the 10 MK18 Mod 2 modeled scenarios.  
Table 18.   MCM 1 Annual O&S Cost 
 
 






Table 20.   LCS 1 (Freedom) Annual O&S Cost 
 
 
Table 21.   LCS 2 (Independence) Annual O&S Cost 
 
 




Table 23.   MK18 Mod 2 Annual O&S Cost 
 
 













Table 25.   MH-53 E Annual O&S Cost (Annual Hours) 
 
 
Table 26.   MH-60 Annual O&S Cost (Flight Hours) 
 
 








Figure 42.  ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (1 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 44.  ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (2 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 46.  ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (3 MK18 Mod 2) 
 
Figure 47.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (3 MK18 Mod 2) 
 
Figure 48.  ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (4 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 49.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (4 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 51.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (5 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 53.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (6 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 55.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (7 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 57.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (8 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 59.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (9 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 61.  Normalized ACRS Baseline vs. Cost (10 MK18 Mod 2) 
 










































Figure 63.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (2 MK18 Mod 2) 
 
  















































Figure 66.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (5 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 67.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (6 MK18 Mod 2) 
 
 
Figure 68.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (7 MK18 Mod 2) 







































Figure 69.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (8 MK18 Mod 2) 
 
Figure 70.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (9 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 71.  Normalized ACRS Hunt vs. Mission Cost (10 MK18 Mod 2) 
  
Figure 72.  Normalized % Clearance vs. Mission Cost (1 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 73.  Normalized % Clearance vs. Mission Cost (2 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 75.  Normalized % Clearance vs. Mission Cost (4 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 77.  Normalized % Clearance vs. Mission Cost (6 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Figure 79.  Normalized % Clearance vs. Mission Cost (8 MK18 Mod 2) 
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Table 29.   Baseline Costs (1 MK18 Mod 2) 
 






































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 1415.85 272.70 0.00 137.62 5.18 0.88 2.09 8.35 16.51 6.06
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 1415.85 272.70 0.00 137.62 3.84 0.88 2.09 8.35 15.17 4.72





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 721.88 251.07 0.00 137.86 2.64 0.93 1.81 8.37 13.75 3.57
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 721.88 251.07 0.00 137.86 1.96 0.93 1.81 8.37 13.07 2.89
2 MK18 Mod2 BASELINE & HUNT Cost
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Table 31.   Baseline Costs (3 MK18 Mod 2) 
 








































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 503.21 241.17 0.00 137.40 1.84 1.82 1.70 8.34 13.70 3.66
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 503.21 241.17 0.00 137.40 1.36 1.82 1.70 8.34 13.22 3.18





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 412.97 235.34 0.00 137.38 1.51 1.87 1.64 8.34 13.36 3.38
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 412.97 235.34 0.00 137.38 1.12 1.87 1.64 8.34 12.97 2.99
4 MK18 Mod2 BASELINE & HUNT Cost
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Table 33.   Baseline Costs (5 MK18 Mod 2) 
 








































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 372.12 231.83 0.00 137.40 1.36 2.75 1.61 8.34 14.06 4.12
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 372.12 231.83 0.00 137.40 1.01 2.75 1.61 8.34 13.71 3.76





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 350.17 228.04 0.00 136.98 1.28 2.80 1.58 8.32 13.98 4.08
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 350.17 228.04 0.00 136.98 0.95 2.80 1.58 8.32 13.65 3.75
6 MK18 Mod2 BASELINE & HUNT Cost
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Table 35.   Baseline Costs (7 MK18 Mod 2) 
 
 







































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 340.62 226.46 0.00 137.54 1.25 3.69 1.57 8.35 14.85 4.93
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 340.62 226.46 0.00 137.54 0.92 3.69 1.57 8.35 14.53 4.61





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 333.48 223.73 0.00 137.27 1.22 3.74 1.55 8.33 14.84 4.96
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 333.48 223.73 0.00 137.27 0.90 3.74 1.55 8.33 14.52 4.64
8 MK18 Mod2 BASELINE & HUNT Cost
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Table 37.   Baseline Costs (9 MK18 Mod 2) 
 





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 3.60
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 3.10
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 329.05 222.04 0.00 137.25 1.20 4.62 1.53 8.33 15.69 5.83
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 329.05 222.04 0.00 137.25 0.89 4.62 1.53 8.33 15.38 5.52





































1A 574.31 72.26 48.56 0.00 11.56 0.00 2.06 0.50 14.12 11.56
1B 578.81 72.26 100.45 0.00 11.65 0.00 2.06 5.95 19.66 11.65
2A 469.71 124.66 36.40 32.78 9.45 0.00 3.33 2.16 14.94 11.11
2B 473.58 124.47 74.49 32.62 9.53 0.00 3.32 6.35 19.20 11.19
3 (LCS 1) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.93 0.00 1.67 7.79 11.39 2.76
3 (LCS 2) 528.10 235.85 0.00 128.38 1.43 0.00 1.67 7.79 10.89 2.27
LCS1 w/MK18 Mod2 325.51 220.28 0.00 137.34 1.19 4.67 1.52 8.34 15.72 5.86
LCS2 w/MK18 Mod2 325.51 220.28 0.00 137.34 0.88 4.67 1.52 8.34 15.42 5.56
10 MK18 Mod2 BASELINE & HUNT Cost
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